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Abstract 
We investigate the semantic foundations of a method for modeling agents as entities with a 
mental state which was suggested by McCarthy and by Newell. Our goals are to formalize this 
modeling approach and its semantics, to understand the theoretical and practical issues that it 
raises, and to address some of them. In particular, this requires specifying the model’s parameters 
and how these parameters are to be assigned (i.e., their grounding). We propose a basic model in 
which the agent is viewed as a qualitative decision maker with beliefs, preferences, and a decision 
strategy; and we show how these components would determine the agent’s behavior. We ground 
this model in the agent’s interaction with the world, namely, in its actions. This is done by viewing 
model construction as a constraint satisfaction problem in which we search for a model consistent 
with the agent’s behavior and with our general background knowledge. In addition, we investigate 
the conditions under which a mental state model exists, characterizing a class of “goal-seeking” 
agents that can be modeled in this manner; and we suggest wo criteria for choosing between 
consistent models, showing conditions under which they lead to a unique choice of model. @ 
1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
This article investigates the semantic foundations of a modeling method that uses 
formal notions of mental state to represent and reason about agents. In this method, 
agents are described as if they are qualitative decision makers with a mental state 
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consisting of mental attributes such as beliefs, knowledge, and preferences. The use of 
such models, which we refer to as mental-level models, was proposed by McCarthy 
[43] and by Newell [45], and our goals are to provide a formal semantic account of 
this modeling process, to understand some of the key issues it raises, and to address 
some of them. 
The ability to model agents is useful in many settings. In particular, in multi-agent 
systems, the success of one’s action or plan depends on the actions of other agents, 
and a good model of these agents can help construct more informed plans that are 
more likely to succeed. Mental-level models bring two promising properties to this 
task: they provide an abstract, implementation-independent way of representing agents, 
and they are built from intuitive and useful attributes, such as beliefs, goals and inten- 
tions. The abstract nature of mental-level models has a number of important practical 
implications. 
( 1) A single formalism can capture different agents running on different hardware 
platforms and written by designers who have used different programming lan- 
guages and who have followed different design paradigms. 
(2) We may be able to construct mental-level models without privileged access to 
the internal state of the agent because implementation details do not appear in 
these abstract models. 
(3) Fewer lower-level details may mean faster computation. 
The abstract nature of mental-level models is also important for theoretical analysis. 
It provides a uniform basis for comparing and analyzing agents, much like Levesque’s 
Computers as believers paradigm [40] allows for abstract analysis of knowledge rep- 
resentation schemes. The second property, intuitiveness, is valuable in design validation 
since one approach to design validation is to transform low-level descriptions of agents 
that are difficult to analyze, such as procedural programs or mechanical designs, into 
intuitive high-level models. In addition, intuitive descriptions of agents in terms of their 
beliefs and goals are useful when we want to help these agents achieve their goals 
or correct erroneous beliefs. These abilities are sought after in cooperative multi-agent 
systems, in intelligent information systems, and in user interfaces, to name but a few 
areas. 
1.1. Issues in mental-level modeling 
Despite their promising properties, mental-level modeling has not been studied ex- 
tensively in AI. The scarcity of citations on this issue in a recent survey of work on 
mental states within AI by Shoham and Cousins [58] attests to this fact.* Similarly, 
although Newell’s paper on the Knowledge Level [45] is among the most referenced AI 
papers [ 51, in his perspective paper [46], Newell laments the lack of work following 
up on these ideas by the “logicist community”. He mentions Levesque’s [40] as the 
only exception. 
Given this situation, it is worth clarifying what we view as the four central questions 
in mental-level modeling. They are: 
* The only modeling related works there deal with plan recognition. 
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( 1) Structure-what class of models should we consider? 
(2) Grounding-how can we base the model construction process on a definite and 
ob,jective manifestation of the agent? 
(3) Existence-under what conditions will a model exist? 
(4) Choice-how do we choose between different models that are consistent with 
our data? 
The importance of the first question is obvious, however, the others deserve a few words 
of explanation. 
Many researchers upport an agent design approach in which the designer specifies 
an initial (database of beliefs, goals, intentions, etc., which is then explicitly manipulated 
by the agent (e.g., [ 6,49,52,57] and much of the work on belief revision). Grounding 
may not seem a crucial issue for such work because human designers are likely to 
find memal attitudes natural to specify. However, grounding is crucial for modeling 
applications. The whole point here is that we cannot directly observe the mental state 
of another agent. Moreover, there are good reasons why general background knowledge 
alone will not do. First, there is no reason we should know the mental state of agents 
designed by other designers, a common case in multi-agent systems. Second, one cannot 
always predict into the distant future the mental state of agents that learn and adapt, 
even if she designed these agents. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what we mean 
by the mental state of an agent is not even clear when this agent is not designed using a 
knowledg,e-based approach, for example, when it is a C program or the result of training 
a neural net. This last point is crucial if we take seriously Newell’s idea of mental state 
models as abstract descriptions of agents. Grounding is important semantically even 
from the design perspective: it makes concrete the abstract Kripke semantics [35] that 
is often used in the literature, and it allows us to answer a central question in the 
theoretical analysis of agents and their design: Does program X implement mental-level 
specification Y? 
While grounding has been discussed by some authors (see Section 8)) the questions 
of model choice, and in particular, model existence have not received much attention. 
We see rnodel existence as the central theoretical question in this area. Answers to it 
will allow us to evaluate any proposal for mental-level models by telling us under what 
conditi0n.s it is applicable and hence, what assumptions or biases we are making when 
we model agents in this manner. Techniques for choosing among possible models are 
crucial for practical applications, especially prediction, since different models may give 
rise to different predictions. 
1.2. An overview of our approach 
Having described the main questions in mental-level modeling, we proceed with an 
overview of this paper and its view of mental-level modeling. 
Model structure 
We propose a structure for mental-level models (Sections 2 and 3) that is motivated 
by work in decision theory [41] and previous work on knowledge ascription [20,54] 
in which the agent is described as a qualitative decision maker. This model contains 
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three key components: beliefs, preferences, and a decision criterion. We see these as the 
essential components of any mental-level structure, accounting for the agent’s perception 
of the world, its goals, and its method of choosing actions under uncertainty. 
The beliefs of the agent determine which among the possible states of the world it 
considers to be plausible. For example, the possible worlds of interest may be rainy 
and ~~~-~~~~y, and the agent believes rainy to be plausible. The agent’s preferences tell 
us how much it likes each outcome. For example, suppose the agent has two possible 
actions, taking or leaving an umbrella, whose outcomes are described by the following 
table: 
rainy not-rainy 
take umbrella dry, heavy dry, heavy, look stupid 
leave umbrella wet, light dry, light 
The agent’s preferences tell us how much it values each of these outcomes. We 






The agent chooses its action by applying its decision criterion to the outcome of the 
different actions at the plausible worlds. A simple example of a decision criterion is 
maximin, in which the action with the best worst-case outcome is chosen. For example, 
if the agent believes both worlds to be plausible and uses muximin, it will choose the 
action take umbrella, since its worst case outcome is - 1, which is better than the worst 
case outcome of Zeuve umbrella ( -4). However, if the agent believes only ~~t-r~~~y to 
be plausible, it will choose leave umbrella, whose (plausible) worst case outcome ( 10) 
is now much better than that of take umbrella (- 1) . 
Our description evolves in two stages: First, we model simple agents that take one- 
shot actions (Section 2); then, we extend these ideas to cover dynamic agents that can 
take a number of consecutive actions and make observations in between f Section 3). In 
the dynamic case, we must also stipulate a relationship between an agent’s mental state 
at different times; we are especially concerned with belief change. 
In Section 2.3, we show how a model for an agent can be constructed using the main 
semantic observation of this paper: mental attitudes receive their meaning in a context 
of other mental attitudes, and this whole context should be grounded in the behavior 
of the agent which is (in principle) observable. The main tool used here is the agency 
~y~ut~e~i~, the hypo~esis that 
( 1) the agent can be described via beliefs, preferences, and a decision criterion, as 
in the mental-level model outlined above and 
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(2) its ascribed mental state is related to its observed behavior in the specified 
manner. 
Under this hypothesis, we can view the problem of ascribing a mental state to the agent 
as a constraint satisfaction problem. The agent’s ascribed mental state must be such that 
( 1) it would have generated the observed behavior, and 
(2) it is consistent with the background knowledge. 
For instance, consider the above example, and suppose we have as background knowl- 
edge the agent’s preferences (as specified in the table) and its decision criterion, which 
is muximin. If we observe the agent go out without an umbrella, we must conclude that 
it believes not-rainy, for if it had other beliefs, it would have taken a different action. 
We put special focus on this class of belief ascription problems. 
Once a model of an agent has been constructed, it can be used to predict its future 
behavior. In Section 4, we pause to provide some insight on how the above ideas can be 
used to predict the behavior of the modeled agents based on past behavior. We exploit 
our ability to construct mental-level models of agents based on their behavior together 
with the stipulated relationship between the modeled agent’s mental state and its next 
action. 
Model existence and model choice 
In Section 5, we examine model selection and suggest a number of criteria for 
choosing among models. One criterion prefers models that make fewer assumptions 
about the agent’s beliefs, while the other criterion prefers models that (in some precise 
sense) have a better explanatory power. Then, we provide conditions under which these 
criteria lead to a unique model choice when a model exists. Next, in Section 6, we 
characterize a class of “goal-seeking” agents for whom a mental-level model can be 
constructed. These are agents whose behavior satisfies two rationality postulates. 
Our work makes a number of contributions to the study of mental states in AI. First, 
we believe this is the first attempt to formalize this modeling approach. Hence, this 
paper enhances our understanding of this area and the main issues it involves. Second, 
we make a number of semantic contributions in addressing these issues. 
( 1) We make the notion of a decision criterion, which handles the issue of choice 
under uncertainty, an explicit part of the model. 
(2) We provide grounding for mental-level models and mental attitudes. 
(3) We are the first to emphasize and treat the question of model existence. 
(4) We suggest two criteria for model choice and give conditions under which they 
lead to unique model choice. 
As can be seen, our focus in this paper is on semantic issues. The concepts, structures, 
and processes we discuss should serve to deepen our understanding of these issues. They 
are not meant to be practical or implemented directly in their extensive form, although 
we hope that the insight gained can form the basis for appropriate algorithms and data 
structures. 3 
3 As an analogy, naive use of models of first-order logic for the purpose of logical deduction is not a very 
good idea. Instead, one would either use a theorem prover (which manipulates symbols, not models) or some 
model checking method employing an efficient encoding of models. 
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Our work builds on much previous work; In Section 7 we discuss its relationship 
with work in the areas of economics and game theory, and in Section 8 we analyze the 
relationship of this work with existing work in AI. We conclude with a short discussion 
of implementation issues and future work in Section 9. 
2, Static mental-level models 
This section provides a formal account of a proposed structure for mental-level models 
and their ascription process. Various parts of the model we propose should be familiar 
to readers acquainted with decision theory, game theory, and in particular, qualitative 
decision making techniques (see, e.g., [ 411). We examine static agents that take only 
one-shot actions (dynamic agents are discussed in Section 3). These agents enter one 
of a possible set of states, perform an action and restart. We start in Section 2.1 with a 
motivating example introducing the central concepts used in our model. The model itself, 
in which the mental state of the agent is described in terms of its beliefs, preferences, 
and a decision criterion, is described in Section 2.2. This mental state is then related 
and grounded in the agent’s behavior in Section 2.3 which examines the problem of 
ascribing a mental state to an agent, and, in particular, ascribing beliefs. 
2. I. Motivating example 
In order to help the reader relate to the more formal treatment that follows, we shall 
start with an example that in~oduces the central concepts encounters later. 
Example 1. Consider the problem of designing an automated driver. This complex 
task is made even more complex if our driver is to exercise defensive driving. Defensive 
driving requires the driver to reason about the behavior of other drivers in order to 
predict their future behavior. These predictions, in turn, are used by the driver in order 
to choose actions that promote its safety. 4 We shall use a very simple version of this 
problem to illustrate some of our ideas. 
The modeled agent, A, is another vehicle observed by our agent approaching an 
intersection with no stop sign. Our agent is approaching this inters~tion as well, and it 
has the right of way. It must decide whether or not it should stop, and in order to do so, 
it will try to determine whether or not agent A will stop. Its first step is to construct a 
model of agent A’s state. It constructs this model by using its information about agent 
A’s behavior together with general background information about drivers. Our agent 
models agent A as a qualitative decision maker using the model whose fund~e~tal 
components are shown in Fig. 1. 
4 This scenario is motivated by work on fighter pilot simulators which are used in air-combat training. Such 
simulators must perform similar reasoning in the context of even more complex group activity. The ability to 
reason about he mental state of opponents, i.e., their beliefs, goals, and intentions, is important for building 
good simulators. Groups in Australia (AAII) and California (ISI) have incorporated such technology in their 
commercial systems to a limited extent [ 611. 
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Model Frame 
Applying maximin 
Preferences Assigned Filtered using Beliefs 
Fig. 1. Structure of mental-level models. 
First, the modeler supplies a context, or model frame, by choosing a relevant set of 
possible states of the world and a set of actions and their outcomes. Our agent shall 
consider the following states as possible for agent A: 
sl-atmther car is crossing and it has right of way; 
s2-anmother car is crossing and A has right of way; 
s3-no other car is crossing and A has right of way; 
s4-no other car is crossing and A does not have right of way. 
The set of possible actions is: {stop, continue, slow-down} (abbreviated as stop, go, 
slow in Fig. 1) . Each action leads to a particular outcome when executed in one of the 
possible worlds. For instance, if continue is executed at state sl, a collision will follow. 
Fig. 1 (top-left table) contains a more complete description of these outcomes. 
Next, our agent must assess the desirability of each outcome from agent A’s point 
of view. Naturally, collision is a pretty bad outcome; stopping when there is no car 
is also not a good option, though much better than collision. It is often convenient to 
specify p:references numerically, by means of a value function, such that lower values 
are assigned to less desirable outcomes. In our context, we would expect our agent to be 
able to re.asonably assess agent A’s value function. Fig. 1 (bottom-left table) provides 
one reasonable choice for this function. 
Presumably, agent A has some information about the actual state of the world. Let 
us suppose for the moment that its information indicates that sl and s2 are plausible. 
When agent A decides which action to take, it will consider the effects of each action 
on each of the plausible worlds-we call this the plausible outcome of the action-and 
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it will compare these effects in order to choose the action that gives rise to the most 
preferred plausible outcome. 
Examining the bottom-right table in Fig. 1, we see that action stop is better when 
sl is the case, while slow is better when s2 is the case; hence, the choice between 
them is not obvious. This is where agent A’s decision criterion comes in. A decision 
criterion is simply a method for comp~ing the values of alternative actions in the context 
of a number of plausible states. Let us suppose that our agent assumes that agent A 
is cautious and employs the muximin criterion mentioned earlier. In that case, it will 
predict that agent A will stop. 
Unfortunately, our agent does not have access to the internal state of agent A, so 
it cannot observe A’s “beliefs”. Therefore, in order to complete the ascription process, 
it must be able to ascribe beliefs to A using its information about A and its general 
info~a~on about drivers. We refer to this as the ~e~ie~ff~cripti~~ problem. The main 
criteria that the ascribed model must satisfy is descriptive accuracy. Hence, the ascribed 
beliefs of agent A (in fact, the whole ascribed model) must be such that it would 
predict the actions that were actually observed. Thus, belief ascription is a special 
instance of a constraint satisfaction problem, where the constraints are given by the 
stipulated relationship between the various components of the model and our agent’s 
observations. 
In our particular scenario, our agent observes that agent A continues driving without 
slowing down. The sets of plausible worlds that agent A could have that would lead it to 
take this action are: {s3), (~41, ($3, ~4). Notice that our agent does not have a unique 
belief ascription for agent A, i.e., there are a number of models of agent A that are 
consistent with our agent’s information. In Section 5 we shall consider various domain- 
independent heuristics that can be used to choose among a set of models consistent with 
our information. 
We have just seen an example of belief ascription. Our agent has concluded that agent 
A does not “believe” there is another vehicle approaching the int~rs~tion since agent 
A”s (ascribed) set of plausible worlds cannot contain states $1 or ~2. This conclusion is 
useful if we wish to improve agent A’s design, as it points out a flaw in its reasoning, 
sensing, or decision making abilities. Otherwise, a model of an agent’s beliefs may not 
be very useful in the one-shot static model we describe in this section. However, it will 
become useful in the dynamic setting discussed later, where our agent could use it to 
predict agent A’s future behavior. Intuitively, subject to the assumption that A’S beliefs 
persist until new contradictory information arrives, our agent can predict that agent A 
will continue at its current speed, ConsequentIy~ our agent must stop in order to prevent 
an accident. 
2.2. Model structure 
In this section, we describe a formal model of static agents. At this stage, we shall not 
concern ourselves with how one constructs a model for a particular agent but rather with 
the question of what type of structure should be used to describe mental states. Many 
of the de~nitions used here are standard and should be familiar to readers acqu~nted 
with formal work on mental states and the fund~e~tals of decision theory. 
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We start with a low-level description of an agent, motivated by the work of Halpern 
and Moses [26] and of Rosenschein [54], on top of which the mental-level model is 
defined. To clarify our definitions, we will accompany them with a simplified version of 
McCarthy’s thermostat example [43]. The choice of modeling a thermostat, which we 
normally dlo not view as having beliefs, stresses our view of mental states as modeling 
abstractions. 
Example 2. In [43], McCarthy shows how we often ascribe mental states to simple 
devices. Our goal is to formalize his informal discussion of thermostats. We assume that 
we have a thermostat in a room that controls the flow of hot water into that room’s 
radiator. The thermostat can either turn-on or shut-ofS the hot water supply to this 
radiator. It chooses its action based on whether it senses the temperature of the room to 
be above or below a certain threshold value. 
Describing agents. An agent is described as a state machine, having a set of possible 
(local) states, a set of possible actions, and a program, which we call its protocol. 
The agent functions within an environment, also modeled as a state machine with a 
corresponding set of possible states. Intuitively, the environment describes all things 
external to the agent, including possibly other agents. We refer to the state of the whole 
system, i.e., that of both the agent and the environment as a global state. Without loss 
of generality, we will assume that the environment does not perform actions, and that 
the effects of the agent’s actions are a (deterministic) function of its state and the 
environment’s state. 5 These effects are described by the transition function. Thus, the 
agent and the environment can be viewed as a state machine with two components, with 
transitions at each state corresponding to the agent’s possible actions. It may be the 
case that not all combinations of an agent’s local state and an environment’s state are 
possible, and those global states that are possible are called possible worlds. 
Definition 3. An agent is a three-tuple A = (LA, AA, PA), where LA is the agent’s 
Set Of lOCal StUteS, Lid iS its Set Of aCtiOnS, and PA : LA --+ Ad iS its protocol. LE iS 
the environment’s set of possible states. A global state is a pair (,!A, I&) E LA x LE. 
The set of possible worlds is a subset S of the set of global states LA x LE. Finally, 
the transition function, T : (LA x LE ) x Ad + (LA x LE ) maps a global state and an 
action to a new global state. 
In the sequel we often consider partial protocols in which an action is not assigned 
to each state. Partial protocols allow us to represent information about an agent whose 
behavior has been observed only in a subset of its possible states. 
Example Z! (continued). For our thermostat, LA = { -, +}. The symbol - corresponds 
to the case when the thermostat indicates a temperature that is less than the desired 
5 A framework in which the environment does act and in which the outcomes of actions are non-deterministic 
can be mapped into our framework using richer state descriptions and larger sets of states, a common practice 
in game theory. 
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room temperatnre, and the symbol + corresponds to a t~rn~rat~re greater or equal to 
the desired room temperature. The thermostat’s actions, AA, are (turn-on, shut-o#]. 
The environment’s states, LE, are (cold,ok, hot}. We do not assume any necessary 
relation between the states of the thermostat and the environment, taking into account 
the possibility of measurement error. Therefore, the set of possible worlds is exactly 
LA x LE. We chose the following transition function: 
1 (-,cold) (-f-,cold) (-,ok) (+,ok) (-,hot) (+,hot) 
turn-on (--,okl (+,ok) (-,hot) (+,hot) (-,faot) (+,hot) 
shut-off (-,culd) f+,coEd) (-to@ (+,ok) (-,ok) (+,ok) 
In this example, the effects of an action on the environment do not depend on the 
state of the thermostat. In addition, the fact that we use a static, “one-shot” model 
allows us to make certain simplifications. First, we do not explicitly model external 
influences on the room’s temperature other than those stemming from the thermostat’s 
actions. Second, we ignore the effect of the thermostat’s actions on its state since it is 
inconsequential-we adopt the convention that this state does not change. 
Finally, the thermostat’s protocol is the following: 
Given the set S of possible worlds, we can associate with each local state 1 of the 
agent a subset of 8, PW( E) , consisting of all worlds in which the local state of the agent 
is 1. 
Definition 4. The agent’s set of worlds possible at 1, PW( I>, is defined as {w E S ( 
the agent’s local state in w is I}. 
Thus, PW(l) are the worlds consistent with the agent’s state of information when its 
local state is a’. Halpern and Moses [ 261 and Rosenschein [54] use this definition to 
ascribe knowledge to an agent at a world w. Roughly, they say that the agent laaows 
some fact sp at a world w if its local state I in w is such that p holds in all the worlds 
in ~W(~). 
Example 2 (continued). While the thermostat, by definition, knows its local state, it 
knows nothing about the room temperature. Formally, this lack of knowledge follows 
from the fact that we made all elements of La x LE possible, e.g., ( -, hot) is a 
possible world. Intuitively, we are allowing for the possibility of a measurement error 
by the thermostat. 
Example 1 (continued). Let us try to relate these first definitions to the modeling 
problem faced by our driving agent. Agent A, which our agent tried to model, may be 
quite complex. Yet, our agent cared about modeling A in its current circumstances only 
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(i.e., as it is approaching the intersection). Consequently, our agent cared about A’s 
current local state (call it I), A’s current possible actions (i.e.,{srop, continue, slow- 
down}), and A’s current action (i.e., confinue). The possible states of the environment 
are Sl,sZ,SsrS& and so thepossibleglobal states are (I,s1),(1,~2),(1,~3),(l,~4). The 
transition function is described implicitly in Fig. 1. 6 
If truth assignments (for some given language) are attached to each world in S, and 
if a world S’ is defined to be accessible from s whenever the agent’s local states in s 
and S’ are identical, we obtain the familiar S5 Kripke structure. 
Belief. While knowledge (or PW( 2) ) defines what is theoretically possible, belief de- 
fines what, in the eyes of the agent, is the set of worlds that should be taken into 
consideration. We describe the agent’s beliefs using a belief assignment, a function that 
assigns to each local state 1 a nonempty subset of the set of possible worlds. Beliefs are 
modeled as a function of the agent’s local state because this state provides a complete 
description of the agent at a point in time, so it should also determine its beliefs. The 
role beliefs play is to divide the worlds possible at a local state to those that are plausi- 
ble, and thus, are worthy of consideration, and those that are not plausible, and can be 
ignored. 
Definition 5. A belief assignment is a function, B : LA + 2’ \ 8, such that for all 
1 E Ld we have that B(l) C_ PW(l). We refer to B(I) as the worlds plausible at 1. 
Example 2 (continued). One possible belief assignment, which would probably make 
the thermostat’s designer happy, is B ( -) = { -, cold} and B (+) = { +, hot}. From now 
on we will ignore the agent’s local state in the description of the global state and write, 
e.g., B(S) = {hot}. 
We remark that (after adding interpretations to each world) this approach yields a 
KD45 belief operator and a relationship between knowledge and belief that was proposed 
by Kraus and Lehmann in [ 311. 
Preferences. Beliefs really make sense as part of a fuller description of the agent’s 
mental state, which has additional aspects. One of these aspects is the agent’s preference 
order over possible worlds, which may be viewed as an embodiment of the agent’s 
desires. There are various assumptions that can be made about the structure of the 
agent’s preferences. In most of this section, we will only assume that they define a total 
pre-order on the set of possible worlds S. However, in some cases, we may need a 
richer alg,ebraic structure, e.g., one in which addition is defined (e.g., for the principle 
of indifference). In what follows we will use value functions to represent the agent’s 
preferences. 
6 To precisely conform with the definitions, we would have had to include the set of outcomes in the set of 
possible states and to define the effects of actions on these outcomes. 
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Definition 6. A value function is a function u : S + I& 
This numeric representation is most convenient for representing preferences. Under 
this representation, the state st is at least as preferred as state s2 iflu 2 u( ~2). 
Value functions are usually associated with the work of von Neumann and Morgen- 
stern on utility functions [ 621. However, their utility functions express more than a 
simple pre-order over the set of states, and we do not need to incorporate all of their 
additional assumptions. 
Because this section is concerned with simple agents that take one-shot actions and 
restart, we can view values as a function of state. In Section 3, we will need to look 
at more complex value functions that take into account sequences of states rather than 
single states. 
Example 2 (continued). The goal of our thermostat is for the room temperature to be 
ok. Thus, it prefers any global state in which the environment’s state is ok over any global 
state in which the environment’s state is either cold or hot, and is indifferent between 
cold and hot. In addition, it is indifferent between states in which the environment’s 
state is identical, e.g., ( -, ok) and (+, ok). This preference order can be represented by 
a value function which assigns 0 to global states in which the environment’s state (i.e., 
the room temperature) is hot or cold, and which assigns 1 to those states in which the 
environment’s state is ok. 
Plausible outcomes. When the exact state of the world is known, the result of following 
some protocol, P, is also precisely known. (Remember that actions have deterministic 
effects). Therefore, we can evaluate a protocol by looking at the value of the state it 
would generate in the actual world. However, the more common situation is that the 
agent is uncertain about the state of the world and considers a number of states to be 
plausible. Then, we can represent its view of how desirable a protocol P is in a local 
state 1 by a vector whose elements are the values of the plausible states P generates, 
i.e., the worlds generated by using P at B(1). We refer to this tuple as the plausible 
outcome of P. 
Example 2 (continued). The following table gives the value of the outcome of each of 
the thermostat’s possible actions at each of the environment’s possible states (where -k 
stands for either - or +): 
turn-on 1 0 0 
shut-off 0 1 1 
If the thermostat “knew” the precise state of the world, it would have no trouble 
choosing an action based on the value of its outcome. For example, if the state is 
cold, turn-on would lead to the best outcome. When there is uncertainty, the thermostat 
must compare vectors of plausible outcomes instead of single outcomes. For example, 
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if B(Z) = {cold, ok}, the plausible outcome of the action turn-on is (l,O), and the 
plausible outcome of the action shut-ofS is (0,l) . 
Definition 7. Given a transition function T, a belief assignment B, and an arbitrary, 
fixed enumeration of the elements of B(Z), the plausible outcome of a protocol P in 1 
is a tuple whose kth element is the value of the state generated by applying P starting 
at the kth state of B(1). 
Note that because we are considering only static agents, we could have spoken about 
plausible outcomes of actions instead of plausible outcomes of protocols. For static 
agents both are identical. 
Decision criteria. While values are easily compared, it is not a priori clear how to 
compare plausible outcomes, and thus, how to choose among protocols. A strategy for 
choice und’er uncertainty is required, which depends on, e.g., the agent’s attitude towards 
risk. This .strategy is represented by the decision criterion, a function taking a set of 
plausible outcomes, returning the set of most preferred among them. 
We have previously encountered the maximin criterion, which selects those tuples 
whose wor:st case outcome is maximal. ’ Another example is the principle of indifference 
which selects those tuples whose average outcome is maximal. ’ (For a fuller discussion 
of decision criteria consult [ 411.) 
Example 8. Consider the example given in the introduction in which the following 
matrix was used: 
We have seen that when both worlds are plausible the two plausible outcomes are 
(5, - 1) and ( -4,10). When the muximin criterion is used, the first one, corresponding 
to take umbrella is the most preferred. However, when the principle of indifference is 
used, the plausible outcome of leave umbrella is preferred. 
Definition 9. A decision criterion is a function p : UnEW 2”” + UnEN 2R’ \ 0 (i.e. 
from/to sets of equal length tuples of reals), such that for all IA E UnEW 2”” we have 
that p(U) 2 U (i.e., it returns a non-empty subset of the argument set). 
Notice that we can use a decision criterion to compare tuples. For instance, if 
p({w,u}) = {w} th en we can say that w is more preferred than u. 
7 We apply this criterion recursively, i.e., when two tuples have the same worst case outcome, we compare 
the next to worst, and so on. 
8 With an infinite set of tuples, maximin and the principle of indifirence may not have a set of most preferred 
tuples and appropriate variants of these criteria must be defined. 
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Fig. 2. The agency ~yp~~~~~s. 
The agency hypothesis. We can capture the relationship among the various components 
of our mental-level model using the following: 
Definition 10. The agency ~y~~~~e~~~: The agent’s actual protocol has a plausible 
outcome that is most preferred (according to the agent’s decision criterion) among the 
set of plausible outcomes of all possible protocols. 9 
The agency hypoth~is takes the view of a rational balance among the agent’s beliefs, 
values, decision criterion and behavior (see Fig. 2). It states that the agent chooses 
actions whose plausible outcome is maximal according to its decision criterion. Thus, the 
choice of the protocol is dependent upon L1 (I) and u, which define the plausible outcome 
of each protocol, and p, which chooses among these different plausible outcomes. By 
viewing the agent as a qualitative decision maker, the agency hypothesis attributes some 
minimal rationality to the agent, assuming that it would take an action whose plausible 
outcome is most preferred according to some decision criterion. 
We can now formally define a notion of a mental-level model. 
Definition 11. A mental-level model for an agent A = {CA,AA,PA) is a tuple 
(GA,AA, B, u,p), where B is a belief assignment, u is a value function, and p is a 
decision criterion. 
Thus, a mental-level model provides an abstract implementa~on-inde~ndent descrip- 
tion of the agent. Instead of describing its local state in terms of the values of various 
registers, or the values of state variables, we use implementation-independent notions: 
beliefs, preferences, and a decision criterion. 
2.3. Model ascription 
We have taken the first step towards formalizing mental-level models by proposing 
a general structure. Now, we come to the construction task, where we must explain 
the process by which one can model a ~a~ic~lar agent, i.e., the process by which 
g The agent’s possible protocols, are implicitly defined by the set of actions Ad (cf. Definition 3). 
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Fig. 3. Model construction. 
we actually ascribe a mental state to some particular agent. This process should require 
information that we can realistically expect the modeling agent to have. This information 
should primarily consist of the modeled agent’s behavior, which is a concrete, observable 
aspect of it. This behavior is formally captured by our notion of a protocol, or a partial 
protocol when we only know how the agent acts in certain situations. Thus, the modeled 
agent’s ascribed mental state should be grounded in its behavior. 
The agency hypothesis supplies a basis for this process by providing constraints on 
the agent’s mental state given its behavior. That is, it makes only certain mental states 
consistent with a given behavior: those mental states that would have induced such 
behavior. 
Definition 12. A mental-level model for A, (CA,AA, B, u,p) is cunsisterzr with a 
protocol P if for all 1 E ,cd it is the case that the plausible outcome of P is most 
preferred according to B, u, and p. 
It is con,sistent with a partial protocol P’ if it is consistent with some completion P 
of P’. 
This key definition tells us that a mental-level model is consistent with our ob- 
servations of the agent when the model is such that an agent with this mental state 
would display the observed behavior. This definition embodies two key ideas about the 
semantics of mental states: 
( 1) The agent’s ascribed mental state is grounded in its behavior (formally captured 
by its protocol), 
(2) Separate mental attitudes, such as belief and preference, are not interpreted by 
themselves, but rather, they receive their meaning in the context of the agent’s 
whole mental state (see Fig. 3). 
In some applications, such as design validation and program analysis, we can “play 
around” with the modeled entity and obtain sufficient observations to constrain the class 
of consistent models. However, in other applications, such as agent modeling within a 
multi-agent system, we may not be able to make enough observations to reduce the class 
of consistent models to a manageable size. Hence, we will have to introduce assumptions 
that reduce: this class of models. The problem of ascribing a mental state to an agent 
under assumptions Q and based on a (possibly partial) protocol P can be stated as: 
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Find a model of the agent consistent with P that satisjies the assumptions F. 
In this paper, we are particularly interested in a special class of constrained mental-level 
modeling problems, that of belief ascription. In belief ascription our task is to supply 
one component of a mental-level model, the beliefs, given assumptions about the other 
components: the preferences and the decision criterion. However, the general approach 
presented so far can be applied to other ascription problems, e.g., goal ascription. The 
belief ascription problem is formally defined as follows: 
Given an agent A = (CA, Ad, ?A), a value function U, and the decision criterion 
p, find a belief assignment B such that (cd, Ad, B, u, p) is consistent with ‘pA. 
Example 2 (continued). Given our knowledge of the thermostat, what beliefs can we 
ascribe to it? We know the thermostat’s protocol and goals. We will assume that its 
decision criterion simply prefers tuples that are not dominated by any other tuple. lo 
Given this, we have the following constraints on the thermostat’s beliefs: B( -) 2 
{cold} and at least one of ok or hot are in B( +). If the thermostat’s beliefs violate 
these constraints, the plausible outcome of the action prescribed by its protocol would 
be strictly less preferred than the plausible outcome of the other action. 
Our treatment so far can be viewed as assuming knowledge of the agent’s local state. 
While access to such information is possible in certain contexts (e.g., when the modeling 
is done by the designer), it is not likely in many other contexts. Yet, notice that we did 
not make use of such information; the ascription process described here relied only on 
the modeled agent’s action. In general, knowing the local state matters when the agent’s 
possible worlds differ depending on the local state, e.g., when the agent has reliable 
sensors that allow it to rule out certain states of the environment as impossible. This 
task of determining the set of possible worlds is a difficult one, and we view it as part 
of the model framing problem. 
Example 13 (A simple game). The following tree describes a one-person decision 
problem based on a game that appears in [ 341: 
Initially the agent decides whether to choose Y or N. If Y is chosen, a payoff of 1 is 
obtained, otherwise the environment chooses either y, with a payoff of 0 to the agent, 
or n, with a payoff of x > 1. While game theoreticians are mostly concerned with 
how games should be played when the environment is another rational agent, we ask a 
lo Tuple u dominates w if every component of the u is at least as good as the corresponding component of w 
and some component of u is strictly better than the corresponding component of w. 
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simple question: what can we say if we observed the agent’s first move to be N? This 
question is interesting because it is easy to construct a two person game based on this 
decision problem in which N is not a “rational” move. Such behavior, while perhaps 
irrational in some sense, can still be understood as rational given certain beliefs, e.g., 
that the environment will play n. 
The following payoff matrix describes the agent’s decision problem (the different 
states of the world correspond to the environment’s behavior if N is played): 
It 
Y n 
Y 1 1 
N 0 X 
Having chosen N, if the agent’s decision criterion is maximin then regardless of the 
value of JC, the agent must believe that the environment will play n. Belief that y is 
plausible is inconsistent with the agent’s behavior, since it would imply that Y should 
be chosen. 
In the case of the principle of indifference, if x < 2, N is chosen only if the agent 
believes n to be the only plausible world. If x > 2 then a belief that both worlds are 
plausible would also cause N to be preferred. 
Another decision criterion is minima regret. The regret of performing action act in a 
state s is the difference between the best that can be done in state s and the actual payoff 
of act in s. This decision criterion prefers actions whose maximal regret is minimal. 
Here is the “regret” matrix for our decision problem: 
3 
Y n 
Y 0 x-l 
N 1 0 
For an <agent following minimax regret, if x < 2 the agent must believe n to follow 
N, otherwise it may believe either IZ or {n, y}. 
The idea of ascribing to an agent those belief assignments that make it satisfy the 
agency hyjpothesis leads to an interesting semantics for belief, stemming from its ground- 
ing in actions: The agent’s (ascribed) plausible worlds consist of those states that afSect 
its choice of action. 
To better understand this subtle point, consider the special case of an agent whose 
set of possible actions can be varied arbitrarily. We subject this agent to an experi- 
ment in which we examine its chosen action in a local state I given different sets of 
possible actions. A sufficient condition for a global state s E PW(Z) to be considered 
plausible by this agent (i.e., s E B(Z) ) is that a pair a, a’ of actions exists, such that 
for all s’ E PW( 1) \ { } s we have that r(s’, a) = T(s’,a’) but T(s,a) # T(s,a’) and 
the agent would choose a over a’. That is, a and a’ have identical effects on all the 
worlds in PW(Z) except s. Thus, the agent must consider s to be plausible. Other- 
wise, the plausible outcomes of a and a’ would have been identical, and the agent 
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would have not shown preference for one action over the other. This view of beliefs 
is closely related to Savage’s notion of null-states [56] and Morris’ definition of be- 
lief [44]. 
3. Dynamic mental-level models 
In the previous section, we described a model of simple static agents and the basis 
for its construction. In this section we consider a more complex, dynamic model of 
agents that can take sequences of actions interleaved with observations. While many of 
the basic ideas remain the same, some definitions must be adjusted, and a number of 
new issues arise, most significantly, the question of how mental states at different times 
relate to each other. Using a running example, we start by considering those aspects of 
the static model that are inadequate for modeling dynamic agents and show how they 
can be revised in light of our desire to capture the relationship between the agent’s 
state at neighboring time points. Some aspects of this problem of state dynamics are 
considered in Section 3.1, where the dynamics of the agent’s preferences are discussed. 
More central is the problem of modeling the dynamics of an agent’s beliefs. This is the 
topic of Section 3.2 in which one approach is suggested. In Section 3.3, we examine the 
problem of ascribing a mental state to a dynamic agent, which is not an easy task. This 
task can be simplified if we are able to reduce it to multiple instances of the problem of 
mental state ascription in the static model, and we examine the conditions under which 
this is possible. 
3.1. A view of dynamic agents 
Consider a mobile robot acting within a grid world whose task is to visit three 
locations on its way from the initial position Z to the goal position G. This domain 
and one possible path are depicted in Fig. 4. We shall assume that at each position the 
robot either stops or moves in one of four possible directions. The robot can start at 
each of the positions marked Z (in the example it starts at Zo) ; it has a position sensor 
that is accurate to within a distance of one, i.e., the sensor may indicate the actual 
position or any adjacent position; and its local state consists of all its past position 
readings. 
We could use a static model to capture this setting by viewing the agent as making a 
single choice among possible protocols (often called policies or strategies) in the initial 
state. ‘t However, this representation is too coarse and does not adequately support 
the task of prediction. Intuitively, the process of prediction (more fully discussed in 
Section 4) requires modeling an agent at a particular time point and using this model 
to predict its behavior in the future. This, in turn, requires us to use a model that makes 
explicit the relationship between the state of the agent at different time points. 
” This representation of the agent’s decision problem is referred to as a strategic form description in the 
game theory literature. 
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Fig. 4. A task requiring multiple actions. 
In order to model the behavior described in Fig. 4 ad~uately, a number of obvious 
changes must be made to our model. First, we are no longer considering single states, 
but sequences of states, e.g., in the above example, we care about the robot’s path. 
Following [ 201, we shall use the term run to refer to the sequence of global states of 
the agent/environment system starting with its initial state. 
Runs describe the state of the agent and the environment over time. A run is feasible 
with respect o an agent Jr if it is a sequence of global states SO, ~1,. . such that for all 
k > 0, there exists some a E AA for which S-( ~-1, a> = Sk. A run is protocol consistent 
(comisten.t for short) with respect o an agent A if it is a feasible run SO, ~1, . . . such 
that for all k > 0, 7(.3k_i,a) = sk and ~a is consistent with J’s (partial) protocol.12 
That is, this run could be generated by a particular sequence of actions of the agent hat 
is consistent with its (possibly partial) protocol. We denote the set of all feasible runs 
by 7’3, and from now on, by a run we always mean a feasible run, We denote the set 
of suffixes of feasible runs by ‘7?+. Intuitively, a modeling agent needs only consider 
consistent runs when it attempts to ascribe the modeled agent’s beliefs about the past, 
having observed the modeled agent’s past behavior. However, the modeling agent must 
consider all feasible runs as possible when it is attempting to predict he modeled agent’s 
future behavior. 
Next, we reconsider our definitions of beliefs and preferences. Now, our robot cares 
about runs rather than single states, and it is natural to describe it as having beliefs over 
run prefixes and preferences over run suffixes rather than over possible worlds. That is, 
at each state, it has beliefs concerning its current and past states, and it has preferences 
over its future states. Thus, when the robot is at position 2, it has various beliefs about 
what actual path it followed to its currertt state, and it has various preferences over 
I2 That is, either n is assigned by A’s partial protocol to its local state in Sk-_l, or the protocol does not 
specify an action on this particular local state. 
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how it should proceed from here on. It may believe that its path consisted of the path 
depicted in Fig. 4 up to position 2, or it may consider a number of similar possible 
paths. Similarly, according to the task description, it would prefer run suffixes that will 
take it to position 3 and then to the goal over all other run suffixes. l3 
In order to formalize these ideas, we redefine the value function to be over the set of 
run suffixes. 
Definition 14. A value function is a function u : %?,,f + R. 
The definition of beliefs should change, too. Intuitively, instead of having a set of 
plausible worlds, the agent should have a set of plausible run prefixes. In order to 
simplify the model conceptually, we can represent run prefixes using their initial state 
(with the implicit assumption that the protocol, at least up to the current state, is known). 
This follows from our modeling assumption that actions have deterministic effects, and 
hence, each initial global state and protocol determine a unique run. l4 For example, 
in Fig. 4, the first 5 motion actions combined with the initial state (which cannot be 
completely depicted in the figure) determine a unique current global state. In this model, 
the environment’s state in each global state describes the robot’s actual position, as well 
as the readings it will receive if it were to reach a certain position at a certain time. The 
local state describes the sequence of position readings obtained so far. 
Definition 15. Let I & LA x LE be the set of initial worlds, and define the function 
PWI on local states as follows: 
PW,(Z) = {so E I 1 SO, ~1,. . . is a consistent run of A, 
and there exists some integer n and environment state e 
such that s, = (E, e)}. 
PW,(Z) is called the set of possible initial worlds at 1. 
A belief assignment is a function BI : L 4 2I \ 8 such that for all I E L we have that 
BI(/) C PW,(O. 
PW, (1) tells us from which initial global states it is possible to reach the local state 1. 
Let us consider how the robot’s beliefs evolve. Suppose that among its possible initial 
worlds the robot finds those in which the position readings are accurate to be the most 
plausible. Hence, initially it will have four plausible initial worlds, corresponding to 
the four possible initial positions; each of these worlds will embody the assumption 
that future sensor readings will be correct. Suppose that the robot starts sensing only 
after its first motion command, which is “go down”, and it receives a reading of (2,2) 
as its current position. Consequently, it will believe that its current position is (2,2). 
I3 In certain situations, preferences over whole runs may he more appropriate. For example, depending on a 
number of modeling choices, this may be the case when the agent has no information about its past positions. 
We refer the reader to [ 81 for a more complete discussion of this issue. 
t4 As we remarked in Section 2, non-determinism is handled by transforming all uncertainty about the effect 
of actions to uncertainty about the initial state of the environment. This means that the initial state specifies 
what position reading the robot will obtain at each point in time at each possible position. 
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Clearly, this belief is equivalent to the belief that its initial position was ( 1,2). Indeed, 
sometimes we find it more convenient to represent the agent’s beliefs using a set of 
plausible current worlds, rather than a set of plausible initial worlds. 
Definition 16. PW,,, : L 4 2’ assigns to each local state 1 its set of possible current 
worlds: 
PWdZ) = {sn I so, Sl,. . . is a consistent run of A, SO E I, 
and there exists some environment state e 
such that S, = (I, e)}. 
The curretlt belief assignment is the function B,,, : L + 2’ \ 8 such that 
&,A) = {in 1 so, ~13.. . is a consistent run of A, SO E B!(Z), 
and for some integer n and environment state e 
we have that sn = (I, e)}. 
That is, PW,,,(Z) will contain a possible world s if the agent’s local state in s is 
1, and s appears in a run which commences at one of the initial worlds. B,,,(Z) will 
contain those currently possible worlds occurring in a consistent run that commences in 
a plausible initial world. 
The plausible outcome of a protocol P at a local state I is defined much as be- 
fore. For our robot, given a set of plausible current states, each protocol would define 
a set of run suffixes which correspond to some path with associated sensor readings. 
Each such1 path has some value, as we explained earlier. Hence, with each proto- 
col we can associate a tuple of values signifying the value of these plausible future 
paths. 
Definition 17. Given an arbitrary, fixed enumeration of B,,,(Z), the plausible outcome 
of a protocol P in 1 is a tuple whose kth element is the value of the run suffix generated 
by applying P starting at the kth state of B,,,(l). 
Notice how, in our example, the set of plausible worlds, which originally contained 
four members has been reduced to one following new observations. In general, when 
the agent acquires new information, its beliefs will change. In the current example, it 
was pretty much obvious how the robot’s beliefs should change: the new information 
was consistent with the agent’s previous beliefs, and it could be incorporated using a 
process much like probabilistic conditioning or logical conjunction. However, suppose 
that after its second motion command (another “go down”), the robot’s position reading 
is (3,1). This reading is inconsistent with its previous beliefs, under which only a 
reading of (3,2) would be plausible, and simple conditioning yields an empty set of 
beliefs. In this situation, there are various ways in which the robot could revise its 
beliefs. For example, it could assume that current readings take precedence over future 
readings, in which case it will come to believe that its initial position was ( 1, 1) and 
that its first sensor reading was inaccurate. This issue of belief change is dealt with in 
Section 3.2. But first, let us consider preferences. 
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Unlike beliefs, we envision preferences to be quite stable. For example, suppose that 
our agent believes its position is (3,6), and it is comparing two possible paths p and p’ 
in both of which its next position would be position 2. If it prefers p to p’ and its next 
reading is consistent with its belief that it has now reached position 2, it should prefer 
the remainder of p over the remainder of pi. More generally, suppose that the agent 
is uncert~n about the state of the world, and it considers three initial states plausible: 
st, ~2.3. It has two possible protocols, one leading to the runs ~1, r2, r3 in each of 
the worlds, respectively; and one leading to the runs r{ , r-b, r-i in each of the worlds, 
respectively; and it prefers the first protocol. Now, suppose that both protocols assign 
the same action, a, to the agent’s current local state and that after performing a, the 
agent’s beliefs do not change, i.e., st, ~2, sg itre still its plausible initial states. It is 
most natural to expect that the agent will still prefer the first protocol over the second 
protocol. Similarly, if we learned only now that the agent preferred the first protocol 
to the second, we would expect that it had similar preferences before performing a, 
since these protocols do not differ on the first step. ~ons~uently, we assume that the 
following property, motivated by the intuition above, is satisfied by u and p. 
Definition 18. Let s . r, where s E & x L and r E 7&f, denote a run suffix whose 
first state is s, followed by the run suffix r. A decision criterion p is static with 
respect to a value function u if for any natural number k, for any set of run suf- 
fixes rl , . . . , rk, ri, . . . , r;, SI . r-1,. . . , Sk . rk, s1 - ri,. . , , Sk ’ r-L E 7&f, we have that 
(u(sI ’ rl),...rU(Sk ’ rk)) is at least as preferred as (U(St . r{),...,U(sk. ri)) iff 
(U(Tl),..-r U(Q)) is at least as preferred as (u(ri),...,u(ri)). 
That is, if we compare two tuples of values of run suffixes that have an identical 
tuple of states as their prefix, then the first tuple is more desirable than the second tuple 
if and only if the first tuple of values of the same run suffixes, but with the first state 
truncated, is more desirable than the corresponding second tuple. 
Notice that given the fact that p is static with respect to II, it is easy to modify the 
definition of plausible outcome to use Bi instead of B,,,. 
We have explained how the concepts of state, beliefs, and preferences change when 
we move to the dynamic model. In many respects, the decision process itself, remains 
as it was before. At each state, the agent compares a set of plausible outcomes and 
uses its value function and decision criterion (which we assume to be fixed) to choose 
the most desirable one. Consequently, the model ascription process is similar, and the 
constraint we must satisfy is that at each local state, the agent’s actual choice conforms 
with the choice predicted by the model. 
The main difference between the decision process in static and dynamic settings is 
that in order to match the notion of preference over runs, we must define the plausible 
outcomes based on sets of run suffixes rather than based on sets of states. This implies 
that we must view the agent as choosing between protocols rather than single actions, 
since a single action produces a single next state while a protocol produces a sequence of 
states. Indeed, our mobile robot must choose among different paths rather than different 
next positions; next positions cannot be judged “good” or “bad” by themselves but only 
in the context of the actions that follow. For example, the move from position 1 to 
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position (3,3) in Fig. 4 is good if it is followed by actions that lead to the displayed 
path. It is not good if it is followed by actions that lead the robot back to ( 1, 1) . 
This view of the decision making process raises two practical issues: The first issue 
is why should the agent repeat the above comparison of protocols at each state; it can 
simply make the choice once and for all. Indeed, we will show that under certain natural 
conditions, a model in which the agent makes its choice once and for all is equivalent to 
the model described above. However, this is true only when the agent’s beliefs change 
in a particular fashion and when its preferences have certain properties. We view this 
result as an indirect justification for adopting these constraints on the model. The second 
issue has to do with the feasibility of the above decision process. The size of the set of 
protocols is very large (exponential in the number of steps in the worst case). Hence, 
comparing all protocols is not a feasible alternative for the decision maker or for its 
modeler. l5 One solution would be to compare a single action at a time. Assuming a 
small, fixed set of actions, this is considerably simpler. However, this would require 
assigning values to single states, rather than the more immediately plausible approach 
of assigning values to run suffixes. In Section 3.3, we show when it is possible to use 
such a decomposed model in which the decision making process is reduced to choices 
between single actions in the current state. 
3.2. Belief change 
As the agent makes new observations, its local state changes and with it its knowledge. 
We can illustrate this process using Fig. 5. The agent is initially in local state I, where 
the possible initial worlds are u, w, X, y. It has two actions it can take, a and a’, each 
leading to one of two new local states: a leads into Ii when the initial world is u or 
n and into 12 otherwise. a’ leads into 13 when the initial world is x or y and into 14 
otherwise. We see that after performing either action, the agent’s knowledge increases 
because it considers fewer initial worlds to be possible. This need not always be the 
case, since the agent may “forget”. We also see that the agent’s new local state is a 
function of its action and the actual world. For example, if it performs a and the actual 
initial world is X, its new local state is 11. However, if the actual world is y, its new 
local state is 12. 
With the change in the agent’s local state following new observations, its ascribed 
mental state should change as well. Our mental-level model has two components which 
are not state-dependent, the agent’s preferences and decision criterion, and one compo- 
nent whiclh is state-dependent, its beliefs. In the static model, we did not require any 
relationship to hold between the beliefs of the agent at different local states, and the 
process of belief ascription could have been done locally. However, now local states 
are more closely related to one another through temporal order. We wish to add global 
constraints on the agent’s beliefs that reflect these relations between local states. That 
is, we would like to model an agent’s belief change. 
I5 While this point makes intuitive sense, the process of choosing among protocols can, in certain contexts 
be implemented in a very efficient manner that does not involve an explicit comparison of all alternatives. It 
is important to remember that we are only committed to the semantics of this process. 
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Fig. 5. The change in an agent’s local state after performing actions a and a’, respectively. 
There is vast literature on the issue of how an agent should change its beliefs (e.g., 
[ 2,7,16,22,28,29] ), and we will discuss its relation to our work later on. However, 
our modeling perspective will lead us to ask somewhat different questions. 
In what follows, we assume our agent does not forget. Formally, an agent has pelfect 
recall if its local state encodes all previous local states. This implies that the agent’s 
local state is never the same in two different global states on a given run. Some of the 
following results also apply when this property holds under weaker conditions, e.g., the 
agent has a clock. 
Consider the following restriction on belief change: my new plausible worlds should be 
those worlds that were previously plausible and are consistent with my new information 
whenever such worlds exist. 
Definition 19. A belief assignment BJ is admissible, l6 if for local states I, I’ such that 
I’ follows I on some run, PWI (Z’) n BI (I) # 0 implies that BI (I’) = PWI (1’) n BI (1). 
If PW, (1’) n BI (Z) = 0, 1’ is called a revision state and the agent’s new beliefs BJ (I’) 
can be any subset of PWI (I’). 
This manner of revising beliefs given consistent information can be viewed as the 
qualitative analogue of probabilistic conditioning, or alternatively to conjoining the new 
information to the agent’s current beliefs. Indeed, this operation is quite standard in the 
literature on belief revision, which concentrates on restricting the agent’s new beliefs in 
what we call revision states. 
We can illustrate the process of belief change using Fig. 5. Assume that BI( Z) = 
{x, w}. After performing action a the agent finds itself in state Et. If the agent’s beliefs 
are admissible then BI( El) = {x}. However, assume that BI( 1) = {x, ZI} and the agent 
arrives at 12 after performing a. Now we cannot say anything about the agent’s beliefs 
at Z2, even if its beliefs are admissible (except of course B,( Z2) & {w, y}). Clearly, the 
agent’s plausible worlds in the past are not really possible, and it must now revise its 
beliefs to reflect this. 
l6 This is unrelated to the game-theoretic notion of admissibility. 
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If we were to assume that the set of possible worlds consists of models of some 
theory then, in syntactic terms, admissibility corresponds to conjoining the new data 
with the existing beliefs, whenever this is consistent. 
We can understand this restriction better through the following representation theorem. 
This theorem shows that we can either ascribe the agent beliefs that change locally in 
accordance to the admissibility requirement or we can ascribe the agent a more complex 
static ranking structure that uniquely determines its beliefs in each state. Specifically, at 
each state 1’ the set BI( I) is exactly the set of elements in PWI(Z) that are minimal with 
respect to this ranking. 
Definition 20. A well founded ranking r of a set Q is a mapping from Q to a well 
ordered set 0 (which we will take to be the integers). Given a subset Q’ of Q, the 
elements minimal in Q’ are those that are assigned the minimal rank among the ranks 
assigned to elements of Q’. 
A ranking of Q associates each member of Q with the group of other members having 
the same rank and orders these groups according to the rank assigned to them. In general 
one speaks of a total pre-order with minimal elements. The elements of lower ranks are 
considered better, more preferred, or more likely. 
Theorem 21. Assuming perfect recall, a belief assignment B is admissible ifs there is 
a ranking ,function r (i.e., a total pre-order) on the possible initial worlds such that 
BI(~) = {s E PW,(O I s is r-minimal in PWl (I) }. 
Patterns of belief change similar to ours emerge in the work of other researchers 
(e.g., [ 22,361). Indeed, relations between belief revision and belief update, and rep- 
resentations using partial and total pre-orders are well known. It was shown by Grove 
1251 that any revision operator that satisfies the AGM postulates [2] can be repre- 
sented using a ranking of the set of possible states. However, to obtain that result, 
additional constraints on the agent’s beliefs in a revision state are needed. We do not 
require such constrains because we are looking at a special case of belief revision: 
our agent has perfect recall and we do not need to account for general counterfac- 
tual reasoning. We learn about the agent’s response to counterfactual queries when 
it receives information that contradicts its beliefs; we called this situation a revi- 
sion state. However, when one observes an agent acting in the world, only a lim- 
ited number of such revisions can occur, all of which must be consistent with the 
actual state of the world. This puts less constraints on the modeler and allows us to 
obtain this. result. When we observe an agent repeatedly performing the same task, 
starting at different actual worlds but with the same local state, we will need the ad- 
ditional properties used in [25,29] to obtain a fixed ranking. However, we note that 
the difference between our approach and the AGM approach [2] is more fundamen- 
tal. They ask the question: how should I change my beliefs? We ask: how should 
I model the belief change of another agent? This difference becomes clearer in the 
next subsection, where we examine the suitability of admissible beliefs for modeling 
agents. 
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Finally, in [lo] we investigate another pattern of belief change, which we call weak 
admissibility. Weakly admissible beliefs allow the new plausible worlds to contain pos- 
sible worlds that were not plausible before, even in non-revision states. 
3.3. Ascribing admissible beliefs 
Having defined mental-level models for dynamic agents, we come to the question of 
their construction. The general process of ascribing a mental-level model and the special 
case of ascribing beliefs remain the same with the transition from static to dynamic 
agents. Much like the static case, we must search for models that are consistent with 
the agent’s behavior (i.e., its protocol). 
Definition 22. A mental-level model for a dynamic agent (LA, Ad, B,, u, p) is consis- 
tent with a protocol P if for all I E L it is the case that the plausible outcome of P is 
most preferred according to BI, u, and p, and B, is admissible. It is consistent with a 
partial protocol P’ if it is consistent with some completion P of P’. 
Two properties of dynamic agents seem to make ascribing a mental-level model more 
difficult. Both of these properties have to do with an apparent loss of locality, in terms 
of what beliefs are acceptable and in terms of how we evaluate the effect of actions. The 
first problem is that in the dynamic case an agent’s beliefs in one state are constrained 
by its beliefs in other states. Thus, we cannot decompose the ascription of beliefs. The 
second problem is that the plausible outcome of a protocol P given B(Z) is no longer 
dependent only on the action that P assigns to I. That is, we no longer measure the 
effect of actions locally because we use a value function over runs rather than states. 
Therefore, we cannot say how good a single action is in isolation from the actions 
that follow it, and we must compare complete protocols instead of single actions. For 
example, buying a run-down apartment may lead to a good outcome if I plan to renovate 
it later and sell it at a premium, or it may lead to a bad outcome if I use it as my 
place of residence. As we will see, under the following weak condition on the agent’s 
decision criterion, both of these problems can be handled. Here, we use o to denote 
vector concatenation. 
Definition 23. Let (w, w’) and (u, u’) be two pairs of real valued vectors such that 
]wJ = ]LJ and Iw’I = Iu’I. A d ecision criterion satisfies the sure-thing principle if u o w is 
at least as preferred as u’ o VV’ whenever u is at least as preferred as u’ and w is at least 
as preferred as w’. 
Intuitively the sure-thing principle [ 561 says the following: suppose you prefer action 
a over a’ when the current (or initial) plausible worlds are wt , ~2, wg, and you also 
prefer a over a’ when the plausible worlds are w4, ws, Wrj. Then, you should prefer a 
over a’ when the plausible worlds are WI, ~2, wg , w4, ~5, Wg. 17 
I7 Our definition of the sure-thing principle is not the same as Savage’s original definition because of differ- 
ences in the basic framework. However, the essential idea is the same. 
R.I. Brafman, M. Tennenholk/ArtQicial Intelligence 94 (1997) 217-268 243 
Throughout this section, we restrict ourselves to mental-level models in which the 
decision criterion satisfies the sure-thing principle. Under this assumption, we can show 
that the constraints imposed on beliefs at local states by the admissibility requirements 
make the ascription process easier. 
Theorem ;!4. Let P be an agent’s protocol. If this agent can be ascribed beliefs at the 
initial state and at subsequent revision states based on this protocol, it can be ascribed 
an admissible belief assignment at all local states. 
That is, if we are able to find a consistent assignment of belief to an agent at its 
initial state: based on a given protocol, we are guaranteed that in the following (non- 
revision) local states the belief assignment that is obtained by following the criterion of 
admissibility is also consistent. Revision states are not constrained by the initial belief 
assignment, and ascribing beliefs in these states is analogous to the task of ascribing 
beliefs at initial states. Hence, admissibility, rather than being a handicap is actually an 
advantage. 
The second problem stemmed from the fact that in the dynamic case, the natural 
definition of values is over runs. If we could provide conditions under which a natural 
definition of values over states is possible, we would not have this problem. This will 
allow us to construct a simpler, decomposed model with which it is easier to work. In 
this model, we will need to consider the immediate effect of actions only, rather than 
the long-term effect of protocols. 
Definition 25. A local value function is a function ucur from the set S of global 
states to R. Given a fixed enumeration of the elements of B,,,(Z), the plausible local 
outcome o:f an action a at I is the (suitably ordered) tuple containing u,,,( a( s) ) for 
each s E B,,,(Z). 
With these ideas we can proceed to define a decomposed mental-level model in which 
both the beliefs and the values are localized. That is, the value function is defined over 
states, rather than run suffixes. Consequently, verifying that a decomposed model is 
consistent with a protocol P (or our observations) is much easier: For each local state 
1, we use the state based value function to check whether the action P( 1) that is assigned 
by P at I has the most preferred immediate outcome. 
Definition 26. A decomposed mental-level model is a tuple (L, actions, Bcur, uCUrr p). 
A decomposed mental-level model (L, actions, Bcur, uCUT, p) is consistent with a (pos- 
sibly partial) protocol P if 
(1) for any local state 1 on which P is defined, the plausible local outcome of P(Z) 
in 1 is most preferred among all plausible local outcomes; 
(2) if E” follows 2 on some run, then 
&,,(I’) = PW,,,(I’) n {P(l)(s) t 3 E &w(O), 
when it is not empty. 
(This last condition says that B,,, is admissible.) 
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Given a local value function over states, in order to ascribe beliefs to the agent, we no 
longer have to examine the effects of complete protocols and compare the values of run 
suffixes. Instead, we simply compare the immediate plausible outcome of single actions, 
much like the case of static agents. Hence, decomposed models are conceptually simple, 
are simpler to compute with, and require a simpler representation. 
In the following we will identify runs of bounded length with runs containing a suffix 
all of whose states are identical. We can show the following: 
Theorem 27. Let A be an agent whose possible runs have bounded length, for which 
we can ascribe a consistent mental-level model (L, actions, Bt , u, p), where Bt is ad- 
missible and p satisfies the sure-thing principle. Then, A can be ascn’bed a consistent 
decomposed mental-level model (L, Actions, B,,,, u,,,, p). 
A corollary of these results is thus: 
Corollary 28. Let P be the protocol of an agent, and suppose that this agent can 
be ascribed beliefs at the initial state and at all subsequent revision states based on 
this protocol under a decision criterion that satisfies the sure-thing principle. Then, this 
agent can be ascribed an admissible belief assignment at all local states and a local 
value function over states such that its observed action has a most preferred plausible 
outcome according to the local value function, 
In practice, replacing a standard value function (over runs) with an equivalent local 
value function is quite difficult, requiring a process analogous to dynamic programming. 
Consider an agent playing chess against a computer program. A value function can be 
assigned naturally to a run suffix based on whether or not the agent wins in this run. 
A local value function would tell the agent at each state whether a particular move will 
lead it to a position from which it can win, tie, or lose. Hence, a local value function is 
really an ideal heuristic. Naturally, computing such a function is often unrealistic, but so 
is the task of comparing all possible protocols. In practice, a compromise is struck using 
some form of look-ahead and some local evaluation function, i.e., a less than perfect 
heuristic function. 
4. Prediction 
One central application of agent modeling that is of particular interest in the multi- 
agent context is prediction. In this section we pause to show how the various aspects 
of our theory can be combined to obtain an approach for action prediction using a 
mental-level model. The context we would like to deal with is the following: We 
observed an agent taking part in some activity; we know its goals; and we wish to 
predict its next actions. The approach we suggest underlies some of the work done 
on plan recognition and some of its applications to air-combat simulation, discussed in 
Section 9. 





mental -level model 
predicted behavior 
Fig. 6. Three step prediction process. 
To predict an agent’s next action, we go through three steps (illustrated in Fig. 6): 
( 1) construct a mental-level model of the agent based on actions performed until 
now; 
(2) revise the agent’s ascribed beliefs, if needed, based on the observations it made 
after performing the last action; and 
(3) pre.dict the action (or protocol) which has the most preferred perceived outcome 
based on these beliefs. 
The following example serves to illustrate this idea. 
Example .29. We start with a robot located at an initial position whose task is to find 
a small can located in one of three possible positions: A, B, or C. We assume that the 
robot knows these to be the only possible positions of the can. Hence, we have three 
possible initial states of the environment. The robot can move in any direction and can 
recognize the can from a distance of 2 meters. (See Fig. 7.) 
In this example, a run would describe the trajectory of the robot through the space, 
the position of the can, and, at each point along the run, whether the robot has observed 
the can. 
We will assume that the following value function (over runs) describes the robot’s 
preferences, which depend on the length x of the robot’s trajectory, and on whether or 
not it terminates in the position of the can, 
Lld~ff.[o-x+20* 
{ 
1 if the trajectory terminates at the can, 
0 otherwise. 
Having observed the robot’s initial path, as shown in Fig. 8, we can try to ascribe 
it beliefs using our background knowledge of its preferences and the assumption that 
it uses the maximin criterion (although the following also applies to the principle of 
indifference). What we see is that the ascribed plausible initial worlds are those in 
which the can is in {A, B} or {A, B, C}. That is, only with such initial plausible worlds 
would the robot choose the observed trajectory. For example, if the robot believed only 
one initial possible world to be plausible it would head directly to the can’s position in 
that state. Similarly, if {B, C} was believed, the robot’s path would head more toward 
them. 
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Fig. 7. Initial set-up. 
Fig. 8. Robot’s initial path. 
Next, suppose that the can is in B. At its current position the robot can see that 
the can is not in A, and its local state has changed to incorporate this knowledge. The 
robot’s new beliefs are now revised to contain B and possibly C (assuming its beliefs 
are admissible). Given these beliefs, we can predict that the robot’s next action would 
be to turn to its left (i.e. toward B). 
One weakness of this approach is that we have little to say when the modeled agent’s 
observation contradicts its beliefs (what we called revision states). Recall that our 
definition of admissibility in Section 3.2 does not constrain the agent’s new beliefs under 
these conditions. Recalling the relationship between an admissible belief assignment and 
a ranking over the set of possible worlds discussed there, we can see this problem could 
be overcome if we have observed this agent in the past and have learned its ranking. 
Then, we can use this ranking to deduce the agent’s new beliefs even in a revision state. 
Another approach is possible when our set of possible worlds has more structure to it, 
in which case we can attempt to induce the ranking, or some of its properties. Indeed, 
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most often we equate the set of possible worlds with a set of models of some language, 
in which case different worlds are related by the sentences to which they assign similar 
truth values. We can then introduce various assumptions about the relationship between 
the agent’s beliefs, as stated in that language, before and after new observations are 
made. Various relationships appear in the literature, and a number of such methods are 
discussed in [ 291. As an illustration, consider an agent that knows p V r and believes 
p Aq. Suplpose it now learn 14. Thus, none of the worlds that were previously considered 
plausible are still plausible. However, we could still assume that its belief in p persists. 
5. Choosing among belief assignments 
As we observed in the thermostat example, often there is more than one consistent 
belief assignment. Indeed, we find this to be the case even in simple examples. We can 
handle thi:s problem by using background knowledge to restrict further the kind of models 
we are willing to assign. One common approach for choosing among different models is 
to a priori restrict or rank them. In the first case, we limit the models that we are willing 
to ascribe; this is similar to the restricted hypothesis space bias in machine learning [ 171. 
In the latter case we use the ranking over models to ascribe the most normal consistent 
model; th.is is similar to the notion of preference bias [ 171. I8 In particular, we could 
use the additional structure obtained when the set of possible worlds corresponds to 
models of some propositional language. Then, we restrict the class of models we are 
willing to’ ascribe to those in which the belief assignments correspond to relatively 
simple formulas, such as conjunctions of primitive propositions. l9 Alternatively, we can 
use some measure of the complexity of the formula to rank the different models. 
In this section, we investigate two domain-independent choice heuristics and show 
that under certain conditions they lead to a unique choice of model. We start with some 
general heuristics for the static model and continue with a particular heuristic for the 
dynamic model. 
5.1. Choice assumptions for static agents 
A common modeling bias is to favor models that offer adequate explanation of the 
data. In our case, we would like the ascribed model to be such that, at each state, there is 
a unique most preferred plausible outcome rather than a set of most preferred plausible 
outcomes. 
Definition 30. A mental-level model (LA, Ad, B, u, p) is expkmatory if for all local 
states I, the decision criterion p returns a unique plausible outcome when applied to the 
set of plausible outcomes of all protocols in 1. 
I8 In practice, it seems that people impose biases that make other people’s beliefs or preferences similar to 
their own. 
I9 This was pointed out to us by Hector Levesque. 
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Example 2 (continued). Recall that in Section 2.3 we were able to constrain the 
thermostat’s beliefs in the state “-” to only those that include the state cold. Four 
belief assignments satisfy this property. However, only one of them, B( -) = {cold} 
is explanatory. Given this belief assignment the agent must choose the action turn-on, 
while given any of the other three belief assignments, the agent is indifferent to the 
choice between turn-on and shut-off. 
A different modeling bias is toward greater generality. Given a number of possible 
models that explain some behavior equally we& the preference is for those making 
fewer assumptions regarding the agent’s beliefs. That is, we prefer belief assignments 
in which fewer worlds are ruled out. 
Definition 31. A belief assignment B is more general than B’ if for all 1 E LA we 
have that B’(Z) G B(l) and B # B’. 
Given a set of belief assignments, B, B E t3 is a minimal belief assignment with 
respect to B if there is no B’ E I3 such that B’ is more general than B. 
Thus, minimal belief assignments ascribe to the agent the weakest set of beliefs. 
That is, they exclude as implausible the smallest number of possible worlds. A be- 
lief assignment is minimal explanatory if it is a minimal belief assignment among 
those belief assignments for which the mental-level model is explanatory. That is, a 
minimal explanatory belief assignment rules out just enough worlds to be explana- 
tory. 
Example 2 (continued). Any belief assignment that is a non-empty subset of {ok, hot} 
is explanatory for the state +. However, there is a unique minimal explanatory belief 
assignment for that state: {ok, hot}. 
To summarize, we have the following (unique) minimal explanatory belief assignment 
for the thermostat: 
At this stage we believe we have a satisfactory formal account of McCarthy’s ther- 
mostat example, which has been useful in demonstrating our basic concepts. In this 
example there was a unique minimal explanatory belief assignment. We now proceed to 
examine whether this is true in the general case. 
Example 32. Consider the following decision problem: 
I Sl s2 $3 s4 $5 
a1 2 2 11 2 2 
a2 7 7 0 7 7 
R.I. Brafmn, M. Tennenholtz/Art@cial Intelligence 94 (1997) 217-268 249 
Suppose the agent has taken action at. We can see that both {st , ~2, sg} and {ss, ~4, sg} 
are consistent (explanatory) belief assignments given the principle of insufficient reason 
as a decision criterion. However, there is no unique minimal consistent belief assignment 
because it would have to contain both of these belief assignments, hence it would have 
to be {st , ~2, ~3, ~4, $5). However under this belief assignment, the action a2 is more 
preferred. 
We just saw that a unique minimal belief assignment does not always exist. However, 
for belief assignment problems with certain decision criteria, a unique minimal belief 
assignment and a unique minimal explanatory belief assignment exist. 
Definition 33. Let (u, v’), (x, x’) , and (w, w’) be three pairs of equal length vectors 
of reals. A decision criterion is closed under unions if u o w o x is at least as preferred 
as u’ o w’ o X’ whenever u o w is at least as preferred as U’ o w’ and w o x is at least as 
preferred .as w’ o x’. 
When we substitute the empty vector for w and w’ in this definition, we obtain the 
sure-thing principle. Thus, a decision criterion that is closed under unions satisfies this 
principle. An intuitive reading of this property is the following: suppose that p prefers 
action a over a’ when the plausible worlds are x, y, z and it also prefers a over a’ when 
the plausible worlds are u, w, x. If p is closed under unions, it would prefer a over a’ 
also when the plausible worlds are U, w, x, y, z. 
The principle of insufficient reason is not closed under unions, hence the lack of 
unique mmimal belief assignment in Example 32. However, the maximin criterion is 
closed under unions, as are a number of other criteria discussed in [ 411. 
Theorem 34. Given a belief ascription problem with a decision criterion that is closed 
under unions, if a consistent belief assignment exists then there is a unique minimal 
consistent belief assignment. 
In addition, the above theorem holds when we replace consistent with explanatory 
and consistent. 
5.2. Choosing among admissible beliefs 
In modeling dynamic agents, we prefer to use admissible belief assignments in which 
the agent’s beliefs change coherently over time. However, for such beliefs, the minimality 
bias makes little sense without some additional modifications. As we now show, it is 
possible to have less general beliefs at some times while having more general beliefs at 
other points. 
Example 35. Consider the following case: there are four possible initial worlds in the 
local state It : a, b, c, d. After the first action there are two possible local states 12 and 
13 with worlds a, b possible in 12, and worlds c, d possible in 13. 
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Assume that in 11 we can consistently ascribe beliefs in {a, b} or {a, b, c}, in 12 we 
can consistently ascribe beliefs in {a, b}, and in Zs we can consistently ascribe belief 
in {c} or {c, d}. Therefore, there are two consistent admissible belief assignments: Bi 
assigns {a, b,c} to Ii, {a, b} to Z2 and {c} to 1s while B2 assigns {a, b} to 21, {a, 6) to 
12 and {c, d} to Zs, none of which is more general than the other. Note that Bi U B2 is 
not admissible. 
Hence, in the case of dynamic agents with admissible beliefs, we will have to come 
up with a weaker notion of generality. What seems to us most appropriate is to prefer 
generality at earlier points of time. That is, we prefer to model the agent as setting 
out with a minimal initial belief assignment, making as few initial assumptions about 
the world. This also implies that it will have fewer revision states. In addition, in revi- 
sion states we would also prefer models in which the agent makes fewer assumptions. 
Described in terms of the static ranking associated with agents whose beliefs are ad- 
missible, this type of preference over models translates into a preference of rankings 
that are “thicker” at the bottom. Indeed, in the context of non-monotonic logics such 
preferences are well known. In non-monotonic logics, worlds minimal in a ranking 
structure are often described as “most normal”, and structures that are “thicker” at the 
bottom are often preferred because they make fewer assumptions of non-normality (see, 
e.g., L371). 
Definition 36. An admissible belief assignment BI is more general than Bi if, repre- 
sented as ranking functions, Br and Bi are identical up to some rank m, and By > Bi”’ 
(where By is the set of states in the mth rank of BI). 
We will refer to this definition of more general in the context of admissible beliefs 
and in the resulting definition of minimal belief assignments. 
Theorem 37. For agents with perfect recall, if the decision criterion is closed under 
unions then the set of consistent admissible belief assignments, if non-empty, contains 
a unique minimal belief assignment. 
Again, the above theorem holds when we replace consistent with explanatory and 
consistent. 
6. Existence 
Given any approach to modeling agents (or other entities for that matter), one of 
the most important questions is under which conditions this model is adequate. That 
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is, what k:ind of behaviors can we model using this approach. Or alternatively, if 
we decide to adopt the model, what implicit assumptions are we making about the 
agent’s behavior. We are finally in a position to provide a partial answer to this ques- 
tion. 2o 
We approach this task in a manner similar to Savage’s work on the foundations 
of subject:ive probability [56]. Savage’s approach allows us to ascribe a probability 
assignment and a value function to an agent based on its choice among actions. Similarly, 
we will describe a class of situations and a number of restrictions on the agent’s 
behavior under which a mental-level model with a unique minimal admissible belief 
assignment and a unique minimal explanatory admissible belief assignment can be 
ascribed. 
First, notice that we can trivially ascribe a consistent mental-level model to any agent. 
We simply make all runs have the same value and choose any decision criterion and any 
beliefs. ibis observation shows that we should ask more constrained questions, such as, 
under what conditions can we solve a belief ascription problem or when can we ascribe 
an explanatory model. We will now characterize a class of agents for which beliefs can 
be ascribed 
Goal-seeking agents are agents with perfect recall whose local states are of two types: 
goal states and non-goal states. These agents have a special action, called HALT, which 
intuitively signals the end of a run and must eventually be performed at each run. The 
value of a run is determined by the state in which HALT is performed: it is 1 if HALT 
is performed in a goal state and 0 otherwise. Goal-seeking agents are quite natural from 
the AI perspective, since they describe agents that act to bring about a particular state 
of the world. 
The protocols of goal-seeking agents satisfy two weak rationality postulates that em- 
body a minimal notion of goal-seeking behavior. The rational effort postulate says 
that the agent must halt whenever it is in a goal state or when it is impossible to 
reach a goal state. Thus, the agent does not perform actions unless they can some- 
how help it attain a good state-its efforts are rational. The rational despair pos- 
tulate says that to halt the agent must either be in the goal, or it must be able to 
show a possible world under which it can never reach the goal. Thus, the agent 
does not give up without reason, and its despair is rational. (A stronger postulate 
would require it to stop acting only when it is impossible to reach that goal, no 
matter how unlikely the prospect of reaching the goal is.) Notice that these postu- 
lates refer to the set PW,,,( Z) rather than to B,,,(I) (preventing possible circularity 
later). 
Rational Effort Postulate. The protocol either assigns HALT to a local state I, or it 
assigns an action that weakly dominates HALT. 21 
Hence, unless there is something better to do, HALT is assigned. 
*’ Additional results of this nature appear in [ 12,131. 
*’ Given a tuple u of length k, let u(i) be its ith element. We say that u’ weakly dominates u if for every 
1 < i < k, it is the case that u’(i) 2 u(i) and for some 1 < i < k, u’(i) > u(i). 
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Rational Despair Postulate. The protocol in a non-goal local state 1 is HALT only if 
for some s E PW,,,(Z) there is no protocol that achieves the goal. 
Hence, HALT is assigned in a non-goal state only if it is possible that the goal is 
unachievable. 
Finally, goal-seeking agents use weak dominance as their decision criterion, i.e., they 
strictly prefer w over u iff w weakly dominates U. 
An example of a goal-seeking agent could be an ordinary mobile robot with a goal 
state, some motion command (telling it in which direction to move at each state), 
and some termination condition (telling it when to HALT). Typically, such robots are 
not programmed using a knowledge-based paradigm but rather, they employ a motion 
planner or an ordinary planner. In that case, the two postulates translate into two weak 
requirements on the robot’s termination condition. For instance, a robot that stops only 
when it is in the goal or if it is in a component of its configuration space that is not 
connected to the component containing the goal, will satisfy the two postulates. The 
condition that it employs weak dominance as its decision criterion would be consistent 
with most reasonable motion strategies. In that case, as the following theorem shows, 
we can ascribe beliefs to such a robot. 
Theorem 38. If A is a goal-seeking agent then it can be ascribed a unique mini- 
mal admissible belief assignment and a unique minimal explanatory admissible belief 
assignment. 
If we allow a decision criterion that is stronger than weak dominance (but consistent 
with it), we may have to drop uniqueness from the statement of this theorem. 
We can use this result to show that agents with perfect recall and a HALT action can 
be ascribed a mental-level model with a fully explanatory admissible belief assignment, 
i.e., in which the actual protocol is strictly preferred over all other protocols. We need 
to show that we can attach to these agents goals so that they satisfy the criteria of 
goal-seeking agents. We do so by ascribing to the agent a value function in which all 
runs that can be obtained using its protocol have value 1, while all other runs have 
value 0. 
Many people view rational choice as equivalent to expected utility maximization 
under some probability distribution. We show that in O/l value contexts any behavior 
consistent with expected utility maximization under some probability distribution can be 
attributed belief in our framework. Let us define a B-type agent as one whose beliefs 
are represented by a probability assignment, whose preferences are represented by a O/ 1 
value function, and whose decision criterion is based on the maximum expected utility 
principle. We require only that the agent perform HALT when no action has an expected 
value greater than 0. 
Corollary 39. If an agent can be modeled as a B-type agent, it can also be modeled 
as a plausible outcome maximizer that uses some admissible belief assignment and a 
decision criterion consistent with weak dominance. 
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7. Related1 work in economics and game theory 
There is much work within AI that is relevant to the framework presented in this 
paper, and this work will be discussed in the next section. However, the most closely 
related lines of research can be found within economics, game theory, and decision- 
theory, areas whose relevance to AI research has been pointed out by many researchers, 
most notably, Jon Doyle (e.g., [ 18,191). In particular, three topics of research are 
directly relevant to our work: work on subjective probability and choice theory, work 
on qualitative decision making, and work on revealed preference. In what follows, we 
briefly describe these fields and compare them with our own effort. 
7.1. Subjective probability and choice theory 
A key issue for economists and game-theoreticians in building models of economic 
systems is how to model agent behavior. An agent model must be descriptively ac- 
curate, i.e., it must correctly predict human behavior in economic contexts. Moreover, 
the model should be amenable to mathematical analysis, so that it can be used in 
practice. One of the most popular approaches has been to model economic agents as 
entities with a mental state consisting of beliefs, preferences, and a decision crite- 
rion, much like our model. However, rather than use the qualitative models described 
in this paper, beliefs are modeled using a probability distribution, preferences are 
modeled using a utility function, and the decision criterion is expected utility maxi- 
mization. While this model does not necessarily offer a computational advantage, it 
is mathematically appealing, partly because continuous mathematics offers powerful 
analysis tools and because probability theory is well developed. More importantly, 
it allows us to represent finer degrees of belief and preference as well as risk atti- 
tudes. 
But while the quantitative probabilistic model is quite elegant, it is by no means clear 
that it is an adequate model of human behavior. In particular, most people do not feel 
they perform expected utility calculations when making different choices. But here lies 
an important conceptual idea upon which the theory of modeling choice [ 321 is founded: 
whether or not the agent actually makes its decision using probabilistic reasoning is of 
no consequence. The issue is whether or not a probabilistic model employed externally 
has the re,quired predictive power. That is, will this model lead to accurate predictions 
of observables. This idea is central to our modeling approach as well, and it is the basis 
of Newell’s concept of the knowledge level. 
These considerations lead to the emphasis placed within game theory on existence, 
or representation theorems. These theorems tell the modeler under what assumptions 
on the agent’s behavior the model is applicable. Because the assumptions are on the 
agent’s behavior which is, in principle, observable, they can be empirically tested and 
(in) validated. 
The work of Savage [56] provides what many consider to be the most important 
result in choice representation. Savage provides a set of assumptions about the agent’s 
approach to action choice under which it can be modeled as if it were an expected 
utility maximizer. Again, this does not mean that the agent performs expected utility 
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calculations in his/her head, but that such a model would make correct predictions of 
his/her behavior. One of Savage’s famous conditions is the sure-thing principle. 
Many people find Savage’s assumptions to be quite intuitive from a normative point 
of view. However, their descriptive adequacy is not clear and considerable effort has 
been expanded by psychologists in testing their validity (see e.g., (421). However, 
the relevance of these. studies to the descriptive adequacy of probabilistic modeling of 
artificial agents is not clear. In order to obtain better descriptive models, various weaker 
representation theorems have been proposed. These theorems make weaker assumptions 
on the manner in which agents choose their actions and use weaker representations 
of beliefs in their agents models, e.g., non-additive probabilities (see [21] for more 
details). 
Savage’s seminal result, as well as many following works, make two strong require- 
ments that render their application in our setting quite difficult: One must supply a total 
pre-order on all functions from initial states to outcomes, many of which correspond to 
no existing real-world action; this info~ation will not be available to an observer of the 
system. Moreover, they require a rich state description, where for any natural number 12, 
there exists a partition of the set of states into n subsets, all of which are equally likely. 
Thus, the number of states must be infinite. 
It is still early to compare the well developed theory of choice with our approach, 
and here we simply note a number of differences. Our fo~alism deals with discrete 
descriptions of mental state. Therefore, it can provide semantic foundations for the 
use of these mental states in agent models. This is an important consideration given 
the abundance of work on discrete notions of belief and the prevalence of qualitative 
representation tools within AI. Moreover, by varying the decision criterion we may be 
able to cover different classes of agents. For example, one type of decision criteria we are 
currently looking into takes into account the agent’s limited computational resources. 
Such criteria may be better suited for modeling actual agents. Finally, our approach 
does require substantial background information to be applicable. However, because it 
is discrete and qualitative, it should require less info~ation than that needed to specify 
a quantitative probabilistic model. In addition, we hope that the heuristics for model 
choice, suggested in Section 5, can lessen this burden. 
7.2. ~~aZita?ive decision theory 
While Savage’s work is of great importance to game-theorists, it is of no lesser value 
to decision theorists concerned with the question: how should one make one’s own 
decisions. While there are doubts as to the descriptive adequacy of Savage’s postulates, 
there is much less disa~~ment about their vocative appeal. 22 Because of this appeal 
and consequent progress in the disciplines of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics, 
the last few decades have seen very little work in qualitative decision theory. 
Work in qualitative decision theory has mostly been concerned with the following 
question: how should one make decisions when one has virtually no information about 
the likeliho~ of different states of the world but a good ~sessment of the desirability 
?J Though there is no consensus on this matter. See the articles in [23]. 
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of different outcomes. This is often referred to as decision making under complete 
ignorance. All of the decision criteria that were mentioned in this paper, i.e., maximin, 
minmax regret and the principle of indifference, have been studied in this context [41]. 
However, until recently, there were no representation theorems analogous to Savage’s 
for these qualitative decision models. In [ 12,131, we present the first such results for 
the maximin and minmax regret criteria. Using the language of this paper, these results 
should be viewed as existence theorems for static agents employing these decision 
criteria. 
Our current work has been motivated by the models used in decision making under 
ignorance. However we modified these models to capture qualitative information. Rather 
than assume that all states of the world are possible, as in the above works on qualitative 
decision making, we incorporated a qualitative notion of belief that allows the agent to 
discriminate between more likely and less likely worlds. 
7.3. Revealed preference 
Besides the technical differences, there is an important, but subtle difference between 
choice theory and our work. Both approaches desire sound foundations for abstract 
models of agents. However, choice theorists wish to justify the use of probabilities and 
utilities in modeling the behavior of generic human agents in general economic theories. 
That is, th(ey do not have the engineering motivation of monitoring a particular, actual 
person (or agent) with the goal of constructing a model of this particular person in 
order to explain his/her behavior and predict his/her future behavior. 
Such concerns, which are central to our approach, motivate the work on revealed 
preference in economics. The goal of revealed preference theory is to predict future 
preferences of single agents and classes of agents. For example, based on previous 
consumption habits of an agent, we may be able to predict its future habits. Such 
informaticln can be of considerable value to many economic agents. The basic idea 
is that an agent’s choices in various settings reveal his/her preference among various 
options. For example, the consumer problem in economics is that of choosing a good 
bundle x ( which can be thought of as a vector specifying the quantity of various goods) 
given a certain price vector p and available income y, such that x is the best choice 
under the constraint x . p = y. If we observe a choice x made by a consumer under 
given y and p, we can deduce that this consumer prefers x over all other x’ that satisfy 
the given constraint. 
Under the assumptions that preferences remain stable we can combine a set of ob- 
servations (xi, yi,pi) together with basic assumptions on preferences to “reveal” the 
consumer’s general preference ordering over bundles. For example, one property, called 
the general revealed preference principle stipulates that preferences are acyclic. We refer 
the reader to [ 331 for more details. 
The aims of revealed preference theory and of our work have considerable overlap. 
In both cases, an attempt is made to construct an agent model with predictive power. 
In both areas, the question of preference persistence arises. The main difference is that 
revealed preference theory does not attempt to explain the observed preferences in terms 
of a more basic agent model. Thus, the types of predictions made by revealed preference 
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theory are somewhat like the following: First, an agent is observed passing an object 
from its left side, rather than its right side. Next, it is seen passing an object from the 
right, rather than going over it. Consequently, it is concluded that, when possible, the 
agent would prefer passing an object from the left side rather than passing it from above. 
Such deductions are important, but their scope is narrower. 
8. Related work in AI 
The understanding of mental states has steadily progressed through the effort of 
various researchers, and we have greatly benefited from many existing ideas. We proceed 
to discuss some of the more relevant work. 
Structure 
A large portion of the AI literature on formalizing mental states deals with distinct 
mental attributes such as belief and knowledge, and their dynamics. However, a number 
of researchers suggested more complete models of mental state, e.g., [ 6,49,52,55,57] . 
While their aim has been to supply intuitive and well founded tools for agent specifica- 
tion and design, rather than agent modeling, they are clearly relevant to the question of 
what structure our model should have. Rao and Georgeff [ 521 define an interpreter that 
uses three mental components, beliefs, intentions and desires. Pollack et al. propose an 
abstract agent architecture based on similar mental states [ 491. Rosenschein and Kael- 
bling [55] developed an interpreter that can implement behavior that is specified using 
notions such as knowledge and goals. Shoham [ 571 presents an agent oriented program- 
ming language based on the notions of belief and commitment. What these structures 
lack is the notion of a decision criterion, which embodies the agent’s approach to action 
choice under uncertainty. While the need for deliberation under uncertainty has not es- 
caped the attention of AI researchers (e.g., Thomason [ 601 incorporates some type of 
common-sense deliberation about conflicting goals, and Rao and Georgeff [ 5 1 ] incor- 
porate expected payoff calculations for decision making), qualitative decision criteria 
have only recently shown up in the AI literature on mental states [6, lo]. 
In contrast, we do not include intentions in our model. It seems that intentions play an 
important role in modeling resource bounded agents: much like beliefs allow the agent 
to ignore certain possible outcomes of its actions, intentions allow it to ignore certain 
possible actions. Thus, it may be desirable to integrate intentions into future models. 
Nevertheless, the current model contains the three essential aspects of the mental state 
of any agent acting in the world: perceptions (beliefs), goals (values), and a method 
for choice under uncertainty (decision criterion). 
Grounding 
A number of important works ground single mental attributes, specifically, belief or 
knowledge. Methods of grounding these attributes are useful in our modeling context 
when they show us how to model a particular agent, and when they are able to say 
whether an agent is implementing a particular mental-level specification. 
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Halpern and Moses [ 261 and Rosenschein [ 541 ground the notion of knowledge in 
the relationship between the local state of a machine and the state of its environment. 
We discussed their work in Section 2. This research was the first to ground a mental 
state in a computer science context, and we were motivated by the desire to follow their 
lead, but with a more comprehensive description of an agent’s state. A model of an 
agent’s krmwledge does not tell us about this agent’s actual behavior. 
Other works have proposed groundings for beliefs. We presented our view of the 
semantics of beliefs in the end of Section 2.3. Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller [4] 
ground the: notion of belief in statistical information. Their work answers questions such 
as: what should we believe about the bird Tweety given that 90% of birds fly. Statistical 
information can be viewed as summarizing concrete observation of the world, therefore, 
it is grounded. However, one should notice that the question they pose is normative, not 
descriptive. While statistics can help us form beliefs about how thermostats act, they 
do not provide meaningful answers to the question of what beliefs we should ascribe 
the thermostat. Even in the case of an “intelligent” agent, using those ideas to ascribe 
its beliefs requires knowing what statistical information it has, and that it is acting in 
accordance to the ideas of Bacchus et al. 
Goldszmidt and Pearl’s e-semantics [ 1,241 views beliefs as qualitative representations 
of probabilities: One believes that birds fly if one holds that Pr(FlylBird) M 1. This ap- 
proach is semantically close to ours, since subjective probability can be given semantics 
in terms of the agent’s choice of actions. However, it would provide a roundabout manner 
of modeling agents: first, we ascribe them probabilistic beliefs and then, we discretize 
these beliefs. As we have noted, there are some difficulties in ascribing probabilistic 
beliefs to .agents, and moreover, the discretization process used by e-semantics requires 
a sequence of probability assignments rather than a single probability assignment. The 
semantics of this sequence is not clear. 
Another concrete interpretation for belief is supplied by Levesque’s work on making 
“believers” out of computers [ 38,401. Levesque provides a functional view of knowledge 
bases, treating them as abstract data types on which two operations are performed: 
TELL and ASK. TELL adds new information to the database, and ASK is used to 
query the database. Levesque examines two languages in which these operations can be 
performed. One is a first-order language, and the other contains knowledge operators as 
well. Levesque shows that the stronger TELL and ASK operations, relying on the more 
expressive language, can be implemented using a first-order language only. 
There are interesting similarities between Levesque’s functional view of knowledge 
bases and our view of agents. Levesque’s abstract definition of knowledge bases ignores 
the underlying implementation of these structures and defines them in term of their 
behavior--the responses they make to queries. This is quite similar to our functional 
view of agents emphasizing their behavior: Levesque’s knowledge bases can be viewed as 
restricted agents having three actions-YES, NO, UNKNOWN-corresponding to their 
possible responses to queries. However, the goals of most situated systems (computer, 
mechanical, or biological) involve more than correctly representing their environment, 
although that is definitely useful, and their repertoire of actions is different than query 
responses. Our work examines this more general class of agents. Levesque’s represen- 
tation result, though somewhat different, provides conditions under which it is possible 
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to model an abstract knowledge base using first-order logic. Our existence results show 
when it is possible to model an agent using beliefs, preferences and a decision criterion. 
Levesque’s functional approach enables knowledge representation researchers to treat 
different knowledge-representation structures in a uniform manner, abstracting away im- 
plementation details that are irrelevant to their query answering behavior. This abstract 
view has proven extremely fruitful for understanding central issues in knowledge repre- 
sentation [ 391. Given the success of Levesque’s approach in the more limited domain, 
we hope that the more general abstraction given here will serve the same role in the 
general study of agents. 
Plan recognition 
In plan recognition [3,14,27,30,48] one tries to infer the plans of other agents 
by communicating with them or observing their behavior. This modeling task closely 
resembles the prediction task we discussed in Section 4, and the latter can be viewed 
as giving a semantic account of plan recognition. Most often, the modeled agent is 
human and often its acts are speech acts. Hence, this field does not attempt to provide 
a general semantic theory of mental-level models as abstract description of agents and 
devices. Grounding is not a central issue, since human agents (presumably) have an 
explicit mental state. The issue of existence is not dealt with either, but Kautz’s use of 
circumscription [30] can be viewed as addressing the issue of model choice. 
Given these general differences, among the work on plan recognition we find Pollack’s 
work [ 481 to be the most relevant to our work. Pollack explicitly treats plans as complex 
mental attitudes involving beliefs and intentions of agents with goals. One of her points 
is that the planning agent’s beliefs should be taken into account in deducing its plans, 
since they together with its goals determine its actions. This is reminiscent of our use 
of plausible outcomes. In addition, Pollack’s model incorporates intentions which are 
missing from our model. However, Pollack’s treatment is more syntactic than ours, and 
she presents various syntactic rules for plan inference. In addition Pollack does not 
deal with the issue of choice under uncertainty. She implicitly considers only O/ 1 value 
functions and her agents always choose actions that achieve the goal given their beliefs. 
(This is akin to using the maximin criteria in our case.) Also, Pollack does not deal 
with the issue of belief change explicitly. 
Machine learning 
One driving force behind our research is the desire to use agent models for prediction 
in multi-agent systems. In machine learning, models are also constructed to help make 
predictions. For example, decision trees [50] provide a way of modeling observed 
instances in a manner that enables predicting the classes of future instances. Our work 
brings a special bias to the task of predicting agents’ behavior, in the form of the 
agency-hypothesis: Machines are agents of their designers; they are usually designed 
with a purpose in mind and with some underlying assumptions; therefore, they should 
be modeled accordingly. It is an experimental question whether this bias is justified, 
but we believe that it is quite sensible. One of the reasons we consider the question of 
model existence to be important is because by answering it we can understand this bias 
better. 
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9. Discussion 
In this paper we formalized a method for representing the state of an agent using 
mental attributes. McCarthy advocated this idea in [43] where he motivated this ap- 
proach and suggested a number of ideas for formalizing it. Newell also advocated this 
idea, stressing the need for an abstract level of representation of programs and machines, 
which he called the knowledge level [45]. However, the tone of both papers is, in gen- 
eral, intuitive, informal, and motivational. In fact, in [ 461, Newell laments the lack of 
attempts to pursue this approach within the “logicist community”. We believe this to 
be the first work within AI to provide formal treatment of these ideas. Our approach 
makes a number of semantic contributions: We proposed a structure for a mental-level 
description of an agent’s state which makes explicit the agent’s approach to choice un- 
der uncerminty, via its decision criterion. We explained how this high-level description 
is grounded in less abstract aspects of the agent, its actions. We advocated a holistic 
approach to the issue of grounding, in which one aspect of the agent’s mental state, 
such as its beliefs, receives its meaning in the context of other mental attributes, such as 
preferences, and the whole state is related to the agent’s behavior. We then investigated 
the properties of these models, showing a class of agents that can be modeled using this 
approach, and suggested two criteria for choosing among different consistent models. 
In this work, we were not explicitly concerned with implementation issues. Rather, our 
goal was to clarify basic semantic questions. Despite considerable progress that previous 
research has made toward an understanding of formal semantic models of mental states, 
we felt that clearer and more complete treatment of the semantic foundations of mental- 
level models was needed. However, we now wish to briefly discuss representational 
issues pertaining to mental-level modeling. It should be noted that there have been 
important attempts to automate the design of agent models from which we can learn 
about these and other implementation issues. In particular, work on plan recognition, 
discussed earlier, is of considerable interest. 
A primary concern in applications is what knowledge representation structures should 
be used to construct and store mental-level models. While it is natural and common to 
study the semantics of mental states in terms of possible worlds, this would not be a 
suitable way of actually representing these mental states. 23 The choice of the set of 
possible worlds is one of the framing decisions that the modeler must make. Usually, 
these worlds will be truth assignments to some set of propositions deemed relevant by 
the modeler. This points to the various logics for representing mental states as natural 
tools for reasoning about these models. In particular, Boutilier’s logic for qualitative 
decision theory [6] seems promising. It is able to deal with beliefs, preferences, and a 
limited set of decision criteria; and its semantics is close to ours. Similarly, algorithms 
for constructing mental-level models will be needed. We have designed such algorithms, 
which appear in [ 91, but they are based on the state space representation and are only 
used for conceptual understanding of this issue. 
23 Semantically, probability distributions are also defined over sets of possible worlds, yet efficient represen- 
tations of probability measures employ, e.g., Bayesian nets (471. Similar structures developed for discrete 
notions as well, e.g.,[ 151, may be of use here. 
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In fact, a declarative implementation of the abstract models described in this paper 
may not be desirable. Indeed, an important point behind the concept of mental-level 
models, one stressed by Newell [45] in his discussion of the knowledge level, is that 
they provide an abstract description of a system. If we push this line of reasoning 
another step, we realize that the modeling process itself need not employ an abstract 
logical language, but can simply use the ideas discussed here and in similar work as 
abstract specifications. The implemented system will perform mental-level modeling of 
other agents using data-structures and algorithms that are suitable for its domain. A 
case in point are some of the recent systems used in the air-combat modeling domain 
[ 53,591. The goal of workers in these areas is to provide realistic air-combat simulators. 
Combat pilots use the current behavior of their opponents to ascribe them with goals and 
intentions. Then, they use these models to predict the future behavior of their opponents. 
Consequently, one would expect a simulated pilot to carry out such modeling activity. 
These problems are complicated by the fact that air-combat usually involves group 
activity and ~~rdination. 
The underlying semantic models used by these authors differ from ours in certain 
respects, placing greater emphasis on intention ascription which seems essential for 
generating realistic predictions. However, mental-level models play the above role of 
abstract specification tools. And while the implemented system is guided by the semantic 
model, the implementation itself makes extensive use of domain specific info~ation and 
damain specific heuristics. For example, Tambe’s system [59] assigns heuristic values 
to each consistent model as a means of choosing between different models consistent 
with the modeler’s current information. 
Indeed, often there are many ways to model a given behavior. Therefore, general 
background information about the agent modeled or agents of its type is important 
for discriminating among different possible models. For example, belief ascription is 
a modeling problem constrained by background knowledge of the agent’s goals and 
decision criterion.24 It will be the role of the modeler or its designer to supply this 
info~ation. Alternatively, the modeler may gradu~ly learn this info~atio~. 
Another task which we considered as part of the specification of the model frame was 
that of identifying the set of local states of the agent. What’s problematic about this task 
is that it seems to require access to the internal state of the agent. However, we believe 
that the following approach can be used to address this problem to a certain extent: 
identify local state changes with an action taken by the agent or new observation made 
by the agent. Of course, in principle, recognizing observations that are made by the 
agent also requires access to its internal state, but reasonable deductions can be made 
in many cases. Otherwise, we simply use the agent’s actions as indications of local 
state change. As one would expect, the less we know about the agent and its sensory 
capabilities, the harder this problem is and the harder it is to construct a model frame. 
24 One reason for stressing belief ascription, which requires this type of knowledge, is that agents can 
be equipped with such knowledge. We believe that an agent’s goals and its approach to decision making 
are somewhat stable aspects of it, determined by its designer. Therefore, through observations over time, a 
reasonable understanding of them can be attained. However, dynamic agents that learn and make observations 
will have much less stuble beliefs. 
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Various issues remain for future work. Indeed, much more research on efficient repre- 
sentation, construction, and reasoning techniques is required. Refinements of the model 
structure .are also needed. In particular, a realistic model must somehow deal with the 
bounded computational resources available to real agents. The notion of intention may 
provide some ability to deal with bounded rationality, as possibly could new decision 
criteria. However, considering the fact that, unlike humans, artificial agents are likely 
to have diverse architectures, it is unlikely that a single choice of decision criterion 
will be adequate for modeling all agents. This, again, points to the importance of more 
existence results that will give us a better sense of the modeling capabilities of different 
proposed models. Finally, as observed by researchers on plan recognition, techniques 
for choosing among candidate models are of great practical importance and they should 
be studied farther. We hope to pursue some of these questions in our future work. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
Theorem 21. Assuming perfect recall, a belief assignment B is admissible iff there is 
a ranking function r (i.e., a total pre-order) on the possible initial worlds such that 
BI(Z) = (s E PW[(Z) I s is r-minimal in PW, (1) }. 
Proof. For one direction, assume we are given a ranking, we must show that it induces 
admissible beliefs. First, notice that because of perfect recall, the set of possible initial 
worlds can only decrease. This means that any world that was minimal among the 
possible worlds at one point, will always be minimal in the future, as long as it is still 
possible. Let Z and 1’ be consecutive local states on some run. The previous observation 
implies i3, (1’) 2 BI (1) fl PWr (2’). However, when B, (I) fl PW, (I’) # 8 then no world 
that was not minimal in PWf( Z) can become minimal in PW[( 1’). Hence, BJ( 1’) = 
B,(Z) rl PW,(Z’). 
For the other direction, let I be the set of initial possible worlds and assume that BI 
is admissible, we construct a ranking function based on B,. First, notice that for any two 
initial local state Ii, 12, the sets PW, (11) and PWI (Z2) are disjoint (because of perfect 
recall). Furthermore, perfect recall implies that, if 1; is a local state that can be reached 
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from a state in PWl (Zl ) and 1; is a local state that can be reached from a state in 
PW,(Z2), then PW,( 1:) and PWI( 1;) are disjoint. Therefore, we can separately rank all 
states reachable from PW, (11) and PW,( 12) and then unite these ranking in any manner 
that preserves the ranking over each set. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will 
assume that there is only one possible initial state I and show how to rank PW1( I). At 
the nth step of the algorithm we assign (a possibly empty) set to the nth rank. At 1 we 
assign BI( 2) to rank 1, the lowest (most normal) rank. Let II,. . . , Zk be the possible 
local states at time n in all runs commencing in PW,(Z). We assign to rank n all those 
states in BI (Zj) ( 1 < j < k) that have not been assigned a rank so far. 
The ranking we defined defines an admissible belief assignment, and we now have to 
show that it is identical to the original belief assignment. We prove this by induction on 
the time at which a local state appears in a run. It clearly does at the initial local state 
1. Let Z’ be some local state that appears at time n on some run and let I” be one of its 
children (i.e., I” is a local state at time IZ + 1 at some run whose local state at time IZ 
was 1’). By the induction hypothesis, BI (I’) is indeed equal to the set of minimal ranked 
worlds in PW, (I’). Suppose that BI (Z”) contains a state that is not in B, (1’). Because 
BI is admissible, B, (1’) fl PW, (Z”) = 8. Consequently, BI (1’) f~ BI (1”) = 8. Moreover, 
for any i that may have preceded Z”, it is the case that BI (I^> n PW, (Z”) = 8. Otherwise, 
using the induction hypothesis, some state in PW, (I”) would have been minimal before, 
and hence would have been in B( I’). This means that none of the states in PW,(Z”) 
would have been assigned a rank of n or lower. In stage n + 1 of the construction process 
we assigned all of B, (1”) the rank of IZ + 1 while the rest of PW, (Z”) has not yet been 
assigned a rank. Therefore, the minimally ranked elements of PW,(Z”) are precisely 
B,(Z”). If B[(Z”) n B(Z’) # 8 then we know that B,(Z”) = PW,(Z”) n B(Z’). Since 
perfect recall implies PW! (1”) C PWI (I’), we get that B, (Z”) are the minimal worlds 
in PW, (1”) according to the ranking. 0 
Theorem 24. Let P be the protocol of an agent. Zf this agent can be ascribed beliefs 
at the initial state and at subsequent revision states based on this protocol, it can be 
ascribed an admissible belief assignment at all ZocaZ states. 
Proof. The beliefs ascribed at the initial states uniquely determine the agent’s beliefs at 
subsequent non-revision states assuming admissibility. We claim that this belief assign- 
ment is consistent with observed behavior. Suppose not, this means that at some local 
state another protocol P’ would be chosen given these beliefs. (That is, its plausible 
outcome would be strictly more preferred than that of the observed protocol). However, 
using the assumptions of perfect recall, the sure-thing principle, the fact that p is static 
with respect to to U, and that the beliefs are admissible, we will show that if a protocol 
P’ is more preferred at this state, it would have been more preferred at the previous 
state as well. By repeating this process, we get that this protocol would have been more 
preferred initially, contradicting the fact that the beliefs assigned at the initial state are 
consistent with the observed protocol. 
In order to see this, let I’ and I” be the children of a local state Z (the same argument 
applies when there are more children), that is the possible local states that can follow 
Z when we perform at Z the action assigned by the actual protocol, which by our 
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assumption, is most preferred at 1. By definition, we have that PW, (1’) fl PWl( 2”) = 0. 
If I” is a revision state then we can conclude that the agent’s beliefs in 1 and I’ (i.e., 
its B’) are identical (based on admissibility). This together with the fact that p is 
static with respect to u implies that the same protocols would be preferred in both local 
states. By the same protocols we mean, the same from 1’ on, since there is no point 
in comparing protocols on 1’ that take a different action on Z than the actual protocol, 
since they would not lead to I’. Next, suppose that 1” is not a revision state. Consider 
the protocol P’ that is identical with the actual protocol up to and including 1, and 
which assigns at Z’, Z”, and their descendents the protocols most preferred at 1’ and Z”, 
respectively. These two protocols really apply to different local states, since no local 
state is reachable from both 1’ and I” (because of perfect recall). Therefore, there is 
not conflict. We know that P’ is most preferred in I’ given B, (1’). Hence, using the fact 
that p is static with respect to U, we get that P’ would be most preferred in 1 among 
those protocols that are identical to P’ on 1, if the beliefs in Z were exactly BI( 1’). A 
similar argument applies to I”. Now, we know that B, (1) = BI( I’) U B, (Z”) and that 
B, (1’) rl BI (Z”) = 8. Therefore, we can apply the sure-thing principle to show that P’ 
would be most preferred according to BI (1) among the set of protocols that are identical 
to P’ up to and including 1. In particular, this class of protocols contains the protocols 
most preferred at Z (by our assumption). Hence P’ is most preferred at 1. 0 
Theorem 27. Let A be an agent whose possible runs have bounded length, for which 
we can ascribe a consistent mental-level model (LA, AA, BJ, u, p), where BI is admis- 
sible ana’ p satisfies the sure-thing principle. Then, A can be ascribed a consistent 
decomposed mental-level model (13~~ AA, B,,,, uCur, p). 
Proof. Theorem 3 of [ 111 says that when an agent can be ascribed admissible beliefs 
and the assumptions we have made in this paper are satisfied, i.e., p satisfies the sure- 
thing principle and is static with respect to u, and its runs have bounded length, then its 
protocol can be derived from its mental-level model by using backwards induction (BI) _ 
(We repeat the proof next.) Hence we can treat its protocol as a backwards induction 
protocol. This means that at each point, the agent can be viewed as choosing the best 
action (according to its beliefs), given its choices for the following actions. We first 
transform BI into B,,,, which is a cosmetic change. Next, we assign to each state as its 
value, the value of the run suffix obtained by running the backwards induction protocol 
from this point on. Since backwards induction chooses the best action given its future 
choices, which are now embodied in the value of each state, we get equivalent choices. 
Proof of the relationship with backwards induction: Suppose that an agent can be 
ascribed admissible beliefs. This means that it has a mental-level model with admissible 
beliefs according to which its actual protocol is most preferred at all states, including 
the initial state. We now show that P is a backwards induction protocol for A iff it is 
most preferred at the initial state, given our assumptions on p and u and the assumption 
of admissible beliefs. One direction of this claim will then give us what we need for 
the above theorem. In order to simplify the statement of the proof, we will use here 
a stronger notion of most preferred protocol, where whenever P and P’ are equally 
preferred in local state I, but P is more preferred in some revision state that can be 
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reached by both protocols, we will consider P to be more preferred at I as well. This 
will apply when we have two protocols that behave identically on all non-revision states, 
but diverge on revision states. The plausible outcome of such protocols is identical, and 
the decision criterion will not distinguish between them. However, once we get to the 
revision state, one will be preferred over the other, and so we use that fact already at 
the initial state. 
First we show that the protocol most preferred at the initial local state is a 31 protocol, 
We do so by induction. For tree of depth 1 this is obvious. Suppose that we have shown 
this to be the case for trees of depth less than n and let root, the initial local state, be of 
height n. Suppose that P is most preferred on rout, to which it assigns the actions a. By 
the previous theorem P is also most preferred at its children. ~thout loss of generality, 
assume that it has two children I’ and 1”. By the induction hy~thesis, the protocols 
most preferred on 1” and I” are BI protocols. Suppose that the BI protocol assigns b to 
root. By its definition, the BI protocol selects the action most preferred given the BI 
choices for the children. If it chose b at root, then this means that doing b and then 
the BI protocol on B’s children is better than doing a and then the BI protocol on a’s 
children. But this contradicts the fact that P is most preferred at root. Therefore, P is 
a BI protocol. 
We must now show that BI protocols are most preferred at the initial state. Suppose 
that P is BI at root. This means that it is a most preferred protocol among BI protocols 
at raat. Since we have shown that the most preferred protocols at rapt are BI, then P 
is at least as preferred as them, and hence, is most preferred. q 
Corollary 28. L+et P be the obse~ed protocol of an agent, and suppose that this agent 
caa be ascn’bed beliefs at the initial state and at all subsequent revision states bused 
on this protocol. Then, it can be ascribed an admissible belief assignment at all local 
states and a local value function over states such that its observed action has a most 
preferred plausible outcome according to the local value function. 
Proof. This is an immediate conclusion from the previous two theorems. The first allows 
us to ascribe a structure with admissible beliefs, while the latter allows us to switch to 
a local representation in that case. Cl 
Theorem 34. Given a be~i~ascription problem with a decision cr~teria~ that is closed 
alder unions, if a consistent (~planato~) belief ~signment exists then there is a 
unique minimal (~~anatu~) consistent belief assignment. 
Proof. The belief assignment has to satisfy local criteria, i.e., for any local state the 
actual protocol has a most preferred plausible outcome with respect to the decision 
criteria. Since the decision criterion is closed under unions, then we have that if B and 
B’ are consistent belief assignments then so is B U B’. This ensures uniqueness. El 
Theorem 37. For agents with petfect recall, if the decision criteria is closed under 
unions then the set of consistent admissible (explanatory) belief assignments, if non- 
empty, contains a unique minimal (explanatory) belief assignment. 
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Proof. Given that the agents have perfect recall we know that we can think of their 
belief assignments as rankings. Assume that B1 and B2 are two different belief assign- 
ments, naae of which is more general than the other. (Throughout this proof, the belief 
assignments we refer to assign subsets of PW,( .) .> We show that we can construct 
an admissible belief assignment that is more general than both. Let 1 be a local state. 
Without loss of generality assume that By # B$. (We use B’ to denote the states in 
the ith rank of B). We claim that an admissible belief assignment B exists such that 
B” = By IJ B;. 
We let B be the union of BI and B2 on the initial local state. Thus, B” = By U Bi. 
Because the decision criterion is closed under unions, we know that that’s fine for these 
states. The definition of admissibility then implies the value of B on any state 1 for 
which PWJ( E) contains a state in B ‘. This is easily seen to be consistent, since it 
implies that B(Z) is either B1 (I), B2(1) or their union, all of which are consistent with 
the protocol. Next, we look to revision states according to B. In these states none of By 
or Bt are: possible, hence we can again assign the union of BI and B2 on these states. 
This process continues until all states are assigned, and as was seen, at each point B is 
consistent with the protocol. 0 
Theorem1 38. If A is a goal-seeking agent then it can be ascribed a unique mini- 
mal admissible belief assignment and a unique minimal explanatory admissible belief 
assignment. 
Proof. We construct an admissible belief assignment BI. Let 1’ be the initial local state. 
If P performs HALT at 1’ then either it is a goal state and we choose BI (2’) = PW, (1’) 
or otherwise there is a world s E PWf (I’) such that the goal cannot be reached from 
s (using Rational Despair). We let B, (1’) be the set of all such worlds. If P does not 
perform HALT we choose the maximal set, S, of states under which P is not weakly 
dominated by any other protocol. A maximal set exists because the decision criterion 
is closed under unions. Such a set is not empty because otherwise P must be HALT 
(applying Rational Effort). We let BI( 1’) = S By definition of admissibility, for any 
state 1 consistent with S (i.e., S II PW,( I) # 0) we must define B,( I> = S n PW, (Z), 
therefore, we need to see that in any state 1 consistent with S, P is still not weakly 
dominated according to S n PW,( I). Assume the contrary. This means that for some 
state s E S fl PWI (I), P does not achieve the goal, while some other protocol, P’, does 
achieve the goal. But this means that there is some protocol P” such that P” is the 
same as P up to I, and the same as P’ from 1. P” weakly dominates P in I’. This 
contradicts our choice of P in I’. 
In states I not consistent with S (i.e., states in which S n 2 = 0), we cannot achieve 
the goal using P. By the Rational Effort postulate this means that at these local states 
the protocol must be HALT (since a protocol that cannot achieve the goal in any state 
does not weakly dominate HALT). By the Rational Despair postulate this means that 
there is some world s E PWl(Z) from which no protocol attains the goal. We let BI( 1) 
be the set of all such worlds. 
To obtain the result, but using explanatory belief assignment, we must construct 
an explanatory belief assignment. Uniqueness follows from the fact that the decision 
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criterion used is closed under unions. The cons~uction is as above, but instead we 
define 5’ to be the set of states on which the protocol achieves the goal. 
Finally, notice that if we drop the uniqueness requirement then we can allow any 
decision criterion consistent with weak dominance (i.e., one in which if w weakly 
dominates o than w is strictly more preferred than 0). D 
Corollary 39. An agent that can be modeled as a B-type agent can be viewed as a 
plausible outcome maximizer that uses some admissible belief assignment and a decision 
criterion consistent with weak dominance. 
Proof. It is easy to check that B-type agents satisfy both of our rationality postulate. 
Thus, they differ from goal-seeking agents only in their decision criterion. Using the 
remark in the previous proofs, we see that they can be ascribed admissible beliefs. 0 
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